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STATEMENT ON JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0) and/or Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). This appeal is taken from a final Order 
and Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, 
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court fail to follow the directive of this Court in TWN I1 in 
granting judgment in favor of TWN where TWN did not present evidence that was 
"explicit and forthcoming" regarding Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed 
to Zions with the word "trustee" typed below his signature sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of descriptio personael This is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual 
findings of the trial court will be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard, and 
questions of law will be reviewed under a "correctness" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994); State v. L.N., 2004 UT App 120,111,91 P.3d 836, 838. [Issue 
preserved: R. 1380 at 118-123; R. 975 at 6; TWNL] 
2. Did the trial court err in allowing Mr. Christenson to read his Affidavit into 
evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule, U.R.E. 
803(5), where the Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the events set forth therein 
1
 "TWNI" refers to this Court's prior opinion in this case entitled TWN, Inc. v. 
Michel, 2003 UT App 70; 66 P.3d 1031, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 
C. [See also R. 824.] Citations to the Court's opinion in TWN I will be made by referring 
to "TWN I" and the page or paragraph number being cited (see, e.g., TWNI&t ^ 1). 
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took place, and not when the subject matter of the Affidavit was fresh in Mr. 
Christenson's memory? This issue will be reviewed under a "correctness" standard. A 
trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its ruling typically will 
be disturbed only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. However, when the evidentiary 
ruling involves an independent legal issue and does not involve the balancing of factors, 
the appellate court reviews the determination for correctness. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 
96,121, 989 P.2d 52, 58 (1999). [Issue preserved: R. 1379 at 18.] 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that Mr. Christenson did not convey to Zions 
his individual interest in the Property when he signed the 1985 Deed to Zions where he 
testified that he could not recall his intent in signing that deed and where the clear weight 
of the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Christenson intended to convey to Zions his entire 
interest in the Property and that he understood thereafter that he had no further interest in 
the Property? This is a question of fact. Factual findings of the trial court will be 
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^ f 15; State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). [Issue preserved: R. 1380 at 118-123.] 
4. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Michels had not properly raised or 
preserved their defense that TWN's claim to be the actual owner of the Property was 
barred under the doctrine of res judicata? This issue involves a question of law. 
Questions of law will be reviewed on appeal under a "correctness" standard. Stangl v. 
Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). [Issue preserved: R. 
1380 at 114-118, 123; R. 1296; R. 1267; R. 1254; R. 975 at 6-8.] 
5. Did the trial court err in failing to rule that TWN's claim to be the owner of 
the Property was barred by res judicata, where the summary judgment order entered 
against Mr. Christensen in August 2000 in his Salt Lake County lawsuit against the 
Michels declared that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the Property and 
where TWN claims title to the Property through Mr. Christenson? This issue involves a 
question of law. Questions of law will be reviewed on appeal under a "correctness" 
standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). [Issue 
preserved: R. 1380 at 114-118, 123; R. 1296; R. 1267; R. 975 at 6-8.] 
6. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Michels had not properly raised their 
defense that the 1984 Tax Sale was invalid and the Tax Deed was void ab initio on the 
ground that Utah County lacked authority to sell at tax sale that portion of the Property 
located in Salt Lake County, and in ruling that this issue was disposed of in TWN 17 This 
issue involves a question of law. Questions of law will be reviewed on appeal under a 
"correctness" standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 
1997). [Issue preserved: R. 1380 at 123; R. 1267; R. 975 at 8.] 
7. Did the trial court err in ruling that the statute of limitations contained in 
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 through -5.3 barred the Michels' invalid tax sale defense where this 
defense was not based on procedural or technical deficiencies in the manner in which the 
tax sale was conducted but instead involved the sale by Utah County of property located 
in another county? This issue involves a question of law. Questions of law will be 
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reviewed on appeal under a "correctness" standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 
948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1997). [Issue preserved: R. 767 at 6-8; R. 975 at 8.] 
8. Does a county lack authority to assess taxes against real property located in 
an adjacent county and hold a tax sale of such property upon non-payment of the assessed 
taxes and, if so, did the trial court err in not ruling that the Tax Deed was void ab initio? 
This issue involves a question of law. Questions of law will be reviewed under a 
"correctness" standard. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 
1997). [Issue preserved: TWNIat 8 n. 7; R. 1380 at 123, 127-130; R. 975 at 8; R. 767 at 
1-5, 8-10; R. 668 at 2-3.] 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
U.C.A. § 59-2-213, § 59-2-301, § 59-2-303(1), § 59-2-325, § 59-2-1001. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1, § 78-12-5.2, § 78-12-5.3. 
U.R.E. 803(5). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court 
Below. 
This action was filed by TWN in July 1999 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County to quiet title to an 83 acre tract of undeveloped real property located in Salt 
Lake County and Utah County ["the Property"]. [R. 9; R. 755.] 
Richard A. Christenson purchased the Property at a tax sale held by Utah County 
in 1984, and received a Tax Deed to the Property. [Ex. 1.] In 1985, Mr. Christenson 
conveyed the Property to Zions by quitclaim deed ["1985 Deed to Zions"] with the word 
"Trustee" typed below his signature. [Ex. 2.] Mr. Christensen's company, Franklin 
Financial, purchased the Property from Zions a year later, received a warranty deed to the 
Property from Zions, and gave a trust deed on the Property to secure the repayment of a 
loan obtained from Zions. Appellants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel ["the Michels"] 
purchased the Property in 1993 at a foreclosure sale held by Zions after Mr. Christenson's 
company defaulted on its loan, and the Michels received a Trustee's Deed to the Property. 
[Ex. 4; R. 1380 at 22.] Appellee TWN, Inc. ["TWN"] claims ownership of the Property 
pursuant to a quitclaim deed executed by Mr. Christenson in 1998. [Ex. 3.] 
The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of TWN, ruling that 
the 1985 Deed to Zions only conveyed Mr. Christensen's interest in the Property as 
trustee for an undisclosed trust, and did not divest Mr. Christensen of all title and interest 
that he held in the Property. [R. 785.] On appeal, this Court reversed the summary 
judgment, holding that the word "trustee" appearing beneath Mr. Christenson's name on 
the 1985 Deed to Zions was not sufficient, by itself, to restrict the conveyance only to 
whatever interest Mr. Christenson held in trust, pursuant to the doctrine of descriptio 
personae. [TWNI at ^ 5.] The Court did not address the other issues raised on appeal. 
[See TWN I at 8 n.7.] 
Following remand, a trial was held on August 1, 2004. [R. 1379.] At trial, Mr. 
Christenson testified that he could not remember his intent in signing the 1985 Deed to 
Zions with the word "Trustee" next to his name. [R. 1379 at 28, 31.] He was shown an 
Affidavit that he had signed in 1999, some fourteen years after the 1985 Deed to Zions 
was executed, but the Affidavit did not refresh his recollection regarding his intent in 
1985. [R. 1379 at 22.] The Michaels objected to TWN's request to allow the witness to 
read the Affidavit into evidence under U.R.E. 803(5), but the trial court permitted the 
reading of the Affidavit at trial. [R. 1379 at 18, 23-25.] 
At the conclusion of TWN's case in chief, the trial court granted the Michels' 
motion to dismiss, ruling that TWN had not presented any persuasive evidence regarding 
Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "trustee" 
following his name, and did not establish that Mr. Christenson had a specific intent to 
sign the deed for a trust. [R. 1379 at 43.] After the Michels had left the courthouse, the 
trial judge summoned the attorneys back to the courtroom, stated that he was striking his 
order granting the motion to dismiss, and, after further argument, denied the motion to 
dismiss, indicating that evidence had been presented by TWN "that responds to the 
question" and ordered that the case continue. [R. 1379 at 44, 54.] The remainder of the 
trial was held on August 31, 2004. [R. 1380.] Following the completion of the trial, and 
after further briefing by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor of TWN, and 
subsequently entered its Order and Judgment quieting title to the Property in TWN. [R. 
1303; R. 1362.] 
The Michels filed a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Order and Judgment on 
December 3, 2004. [R. 1364.] On February 4, 2005, TWN filed with this Court a Motion 
for Summary Disposition and a Motion to Release Lis Pendens or to Require a Guarantee. 
This Court denied the Motion to Release Lis Pendens or to Require a Guarantee on April 
28, 2005, and denied the Motion for Summary Disposition on April 29, 2005. 
B. Statement of Facts,2 
The Property that is the subject of this action consists of approximately 83 acres of 
land, the majority of which is located in Utah County, with the remainder located in Salt 
Lake County. [See TWNI at ^ 1; R. 755 at f 2; R. 1379 at 6-7.] As of 1984, Zions Bank 
["Zions"] was the record owner of the Property. [TWNI at 12; R. 755 at 2, \ 6.] Prior to 
May 1984, Utah County, erroneously believing that the Property was located entirely 
within Utah County, sent out tax billings on the Property. In May 1984, after the taxes 
had not been paid, Utah County sold the Property at a tax sale ["Tax Sale"] to Richard A. 
Christenson for $1,297.93. [ 7 W / a t f 2 andn.l; R. 755 atffl[ 1-5; R. 1380 at 9; Ex. 1.] 
Following the Tax Sale, Mr. Christenson was issued an auditor's tax deed ["Tax Deed"]. 
[Ex. 1; R. 1380 at 8, 9.] It was not until 1995, when a new survey was conducted, that it 
was discovered that part of the Property actually was in Salt Lake County. [TWNI at 1 
n.l;R.755at2,T}8.] 
In 1985, Zions reimbursed Mr. Christenson for the amount paid by him to purchase 
the Property at the Tax Sale. [R. 1380 at 10-12.] In return, Mr. Christensen executed the 
1985 Deed to Zions, whereby the Property and another Salt Lake County property ["Other 
SLC Property"] were conveyed to Zions. [TWNIat 2 , f 3 ; R. 1380 at 11; Ex. 2.] The 
2
 A time line of some of the relevant dates and events in this case is attached hereto 
as Addendum G. 
1985 Deed to Zions was signed by Mr. Christenson with the word "Trustee" printed under 
his signature. [TWNI at lj 3; Ex. 2.] 
In September 1986, Zions sold the Property and the Other SLC Property to 
Franklin Financial ["Franklin"], a company wholly owned by Mr. Christenson, and Zions 
financed the sale. [TWNIat^ 3; R. 1380 at 16, 20-21.] Zions conveyed those properties 
to Franklin by warranty deed [Ex. 5.], and gave Zions a trust deed on the properties to 
secure the repayment of the loan. [Ex. 6; R. 1380 at 20-21.] After Franklin defaulted on 
its loan, Zions foreclosed on the properties at a non-judicial foreclosure sale held on April 
13, 1993. [R. 1380 at 22.] The Michels were the high bidders at the trustee's sale, and 
received a Trustee's Deed to the Property and the Other SLC Property ["Trustee's 
Deed"]. [TWNI at \3; R. 1380 at 22; Ex. 4.] 
In 1998, Mr. Christensen executed a quitclaim deed to TWN ["1998 Deed to 
TWN"], conveying any interest that he had in the Property to TWN. [See TWN I at % 4; 
Ex. 3.] In 1999, TWN brought this action to quiet title to the Property. 
In November 2001, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TWN, 
ruling that just because the 1985 Deed to Zions had the word "Trustee" typed below Mr. 
Christenson's signature, the deed did not convey Mr. Christenson's personal interest in 
the Property, but only whatever interest Mr. Christenson held on behalf of an unnamed 
trust, which was apparently nothing. [See TWN I at If 5; R. 240 at 2.] 
The Michels appealed the trial court's summary judgment order. At oral argument 
the parties acknowledged that Mr. Christenson likely did not actually hold any interest in 
the Property on behalf of a trust. No explanation was offered as to why Mr. Christenson 
would cause his company to acquire title to the Property from Zions for a considerable 
sum of money if he actually believed that Zions had not acquired title to the Property 
from him in 1985 and thus had nothing to convey to his company. [See TWNIat 2 n. 2.] 
On appeal, this Court reversed the summary judgment, holding that, under the 
doctrine of descriptio personae^ 
[t]he unexplained use of the word "trustee" on a real property deed does 
not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a 
trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Therefore, in both 
contexts, the deed should be read and interpreted as if the word "trustee" 
were not there. [7¥W7atf 12.] 
This Court also held in TWNI that while a trustee may dispose of trust property in 
the name of the trustee as trustee, see U.C.A. § 75-7-402(5), 
a trustee's intent to do so must be made clearer than simply placing the 
unadorned word "trustee" after his or her name. A trustee-grantor should 
include on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ 
trust." Alternatively, as the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Boise 
Cascade Corp., a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust 
was, in fact, intended. See 655 P.2d at 669 (suggesting that a counter-
affidavit could have rebutted the presumption of descriptio personae and 
shown that the descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his 
representative capacity rather than in his individual capacity). Otherwise, 
the presumption of descriptio personae will apply, and the deed will operate 
as if the word "trustee" were not there. 
[TWNIzt<k\4.] 
At the conclusion of its decision in TWN7, this Court held that "the word 'trustee' 
appearing next to Mr. Christenson's name on the 1985 Deed to Zions was not sufficient, 
by itself, to restrict the conveyance only to whatever interest Mr. Christenson held in 
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trust." For that reason, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
and remanded the case to the trial court "for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion." [TWNI at % 15.] 
Following remand, a trial was held. Mr. Christenson testified to the events giving 
rise to his purchase of the Property at the Tax Sale, which he said he did to protect the 
Property for Zions. [R. 1380 at 8-9.] Mr. Christenson testified that he recalled the 
circumstances surrounding his receipt of the Tax Deed in 1984 following the purchase of 
the Property at the Tax Sale and that it was his understanding following the receipt of the 
Tax Deed that he owned the Property. [R. 1380 at 7, 10.] 
Mr. Christenson testified that Zions reimbursed him for the amount that he had 
paid to purchase the Property at the Tax Sale, whereupon he gave the bank the 1985 Deed 
to Zions. [TWNI at f 3; R. 1380 at 10-12.] He testified that he could not remember the 
capacity in which he intended to sign the 1985 Deed to Zions, what his intent was in 
executing that deed, or the circumstances regarding the creation of that deed. [R. 1379 at 
28, 31; R. 1380 at 13-14.] He also did not know what he intended to convey by signing 
the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" on the deed. [R. 1379 at 30.] 
The evidence at trial established that following the recording of the 1985 Deed to 
Zions, the Utah County Recorder's office showed that title to the property was vested in 
Zions, not Mr. Christenson. [R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 12 at f 7.] The evidence also showed 
that at no time following the recording of the deed did the Utah County Assessor's office 
assess property taxes on the Property to Mr. Christenson. [R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 12 at f^ 8.] 
At trial, Mr. Christenson was shown an affidavit that he had signed on January 14, 
1999 [the "Affidavit"]. [R. 1379 at 17.] The Affidavit was signed fourteen years after 
the 1985 Deed to Zions was executed, one month after Mr. Christenson signed the 1998 
Deed to TWN, and six months before this action was commenced. [R. 1379 at 20; Exs. 2 
and 3; R. 9 at 6.] After reading the Affidavit to himself, he stated that it did not refresh 
his recollection regarding the signing of the 1985 Deed to Zions or the reason he signed 
that deed with the word "Trustee" next to his signature. [R. 1379 at 22.] 
Mr. Christenson claimed that the statements in the Affidavit were true and 
reflected his recollection at the time he signed the Affidavit. [R. 1379 at 17-18.] He 
provided no testimony or other evidence, however, regarding who had prepared the 
Affidavit, why it had been prepared, why he had signed it, to whom it had been given, or 
any other foundational information regarding the reason he signed it. 
TWN's attorney asked the trial court for permission for Mr. Christenson to read 
the Affidavit into evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay 
rule, U.R.E. 803(5). [R. 1379 at 18.] The Michels' attorney objected, arguing that, under 
Rule 803(5), TWN had to show that the Affidavit "was made or adopted by the witness 
when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory," and that the Affidavit "certainly 
wasn't made at or about the time it was fresh in his mind." [R. 1379 at 18.] Following 
further discussion between the trial court and counsel and voir dire of the witness, the 
trial court granted the request and allowed the witness to read the entire Affidavit into 
evidence. [R. at 19-25.]. Part of what was read is as follows: 
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The client has reviewed that certain quit-claim deed dated March 19th, 1985 
[the 1985 Deed to Zions] . . . and declares that he signed said quit-claim 
deed as trustee for Cape Trust to transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust 
[in] subject property and not any personal interest in Subject Property. 
The legal description contained in Exhibit B differs from that of Exhibit A 
because the interest being conveyed in Exhibit B was the interest of Cape 
Trust and not the personal interest of Richard Christenson. 
[R. 1379 at 24-25.] 
No evidence was provided to support the conclusory statement in the Affidavit that 
Mr. Christenson had signed the 1985 Deed to Zions only as trustee for Cape Trust. There 
was no evidence that Cape Trust had any interest in the Property at that time. 
Although Mr. Christenson claimed to be unable to recall anything about his intent 
in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions, he did recall other events that were inconsistent with 
the statement in the Affidavit that he had signed the 1985 Deed to Zions only as trustee 
for Cape Trust. For example, Mr. Christenson testified that he recalled purchasing the 
Property and the Other SLC Property on behalf of Franklin from Zions in 1986. [R. 1380 
at 16.] The evidence established that Franklin agreed to pay $284,592 for those 
properties. [R. 1380 at 16; Exs. 4 and 6.] Mr. Christenson recalled that his company 
borrowed money from Zions in September 1986, and pledged the Property to Zions to 
secure the loan. [R. 1380 at 20-21.] When Mr. Christenson was asked why he would 
cause his company to buy back the Property from Zions if he claimed to own the 
Property, Mr. Christenson simply responded, "I can't recall all the circumstances." [R. 
1380 at 21.] 
Mi Christenson testified that lie i ecalled tl lat Franklin defaulted on its loan to 
Zions, that Zions held a foreclosure sale of tin : 
Property was sold to the Michels at the foreclosure sale. [R. 1380 at 22.] 
Mr. Christenson recalled filing a lawsuit against the Michels and others :n 1006 in 
tlv Min.l Dr.tii. M HIIJI (tl Sail I ,tlv i uiinh I ' M ' Lav* suit | lu Uwtx :osc a v Li,nu\i 
interest in the Prop ^ "'•<* a- ' • ! '• 1 
Lawsuit, Mr. Christenson an-.-^ed that he was "the beneficial owner of a contract right 
secured hv an Merest in the properties which arc lh< M<bjeei of tM i l.tim " and ihai \h' 
c . --hi :•:'!,«. *.. • \}. n:: ;... Keal Estate l. umrav \ *d\K,>, 
June I, 1978. [Lx. b at 2 * . . •. . 
Property or that he held legal title to the Property. [Ex. 8.] On August 3. 2000, summary 
judgment was granted against Mr. Christenson in the SLC Lawsuit, holding that Mr. 
Christenson did IMI ha\ c any i ijihl, hlli ni interest in tlu hnperty. | l\\, {) at 4, ""I I | 
. ^ Mr. Christenson's financial staten lei it dated Mai cl I 31. 198 'i; ["198 7 Financial 
Statement"] was admitted into evidence at trial. [Lx. *~.j A ^ . Christenson testified that 
the 1{)H / Financial Statement constituted an accurate statement of his finances as of 
Mai h I F'S II-1 l ' S U a l ^ - % 1 Hi, |i)(v. Financial MaicinciU listed ihc .,iajor 
assets, including real propert) ; owned b\ Mr Chrislonsoii „is nl lh.il dnlr \\( I (HO .it {hi\9 
but the Proper! \ u as not listed on the financial statement. [Ex. lu.j Mi. Christenson was 
unable to e\pl<h- •• • ^ UL UM not list the Property as an asset on tk 10S'? Financial 
Siiv- n • . . - p-i
 fcy at that til ne. [£. . < 
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In September 2000, as part of the Michels' motion for reconsideration of the trial 
court's decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of TWN, the Michels raised 
the defense that TWN's claim to be the owner of the Property was barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata because of the Summary Judgment Order entered against Mr. 
Christenson, TWN's predecessor-in-interest, in the SLC Lawsuit one month earlier. The 
trial court did not specifically rule on this issue in its order denying the motion for 
reconsideration. [R. 349; R. 490; R. 1380 at 127.] 
The Michels raised this defense on appeal in TWN I by informing the Court of the 
decision in the SLC Lawsuit, and its dispositive impact on this case, and by attaching to 
their appeal brief a copy of the Summary Judgment Order. [See R. 1380 at 127-128; R. 
1140 at 9, 19 n.10; Addendum F at 9, 19 n. 10.] This Court did not address that issue in 
its opinion in TWN I. 
On remand, the Michels again raised their res judicata defense. They argued that if 
the trial court were to hold that Mr. Christenson owned the Property at the time he signed 
the 1998 Deed to TWN, that ruling would be inconsistent with and contrary to the holding 
of the court in the SLC Lawsuit. [R. 970.] At the conclusion of the trial, the Michels 
moved for leave to amend the pleadings to formally plead the res judicata defense. [R. 
1380 at 123; R. 1267 at 5-6.] The trial court rejected the Michel's argument, ruling that 
this defense was not raised prior to the submission of the parties' summary judgment 
motions and therefore was barred under the "law of the case" doctrine, was not raised in 
the prior appeal, and was not an issue remanded by this Court in TWNL [R. 1302 at 6.] 
-1 A-
1 1 le IV lie 1 ids also asserted that I ' W N did not acquire \ alid title to the JTupem i y 
reason ol tin* 1WX Deed In' l ,( A N because (he I'ax i >ee<J issiu-il in Mi i intusleiii mi ill 
1984 'was void ab initio, either in its entirety or to the extent it purported to convey that •• 
portion of the Property located in Salt I ,ake County, on the grounds that Utah County did 
r . ;.. -, v *,i pioperty located in Salt 1 aki i ^-rity, [R 
668 at 2-3; R 767 ] If the 1 ax Deed is \ oid, tl ici 11 !i CI n istenson acqi in e> ;:l n :> n ltei : st in 
the Property, and could not transfer any interest in the Pi • >! vr! y to i WIN. I his defense 
was rejected by the trial o ^ l on summary judgment on the urounds that the defense u id 
n< > • ..n^c» . . p id j i n? s Rnd w.ic
 n. ; . jurisdictional, and therefore had been 
v a ' :•• ^ !«*n- • *>•» * it y eai stat i ite of In nitat • ••• v. 
§ 7fc-12-5.1 thiuugh-5.3. [R. 78^ i That ruling was appealed in the Michcls ' •" e 
[R. 841; R 1162 at 5 1 The r * «M * 1 ui -**>; y\i\\ however mi this issue in its decision :„ 
771 V I [ /'U7V t .at M u. ,| Al iiitil I ul lowing remand, the trial court refused to consider 
this defense, emu liitliiie lliiil llus issue had hern mleil mi p in imr.K In flic trial m ntnl Hi ml 
not been appealed or was not an issue that had been remanded to the in 
adjudication, and was barred i mder the doctrine of "law of the case." [R 1362 at 7, ^ f 13.] 
:• viiviAR* O F A R G U M E N T S 
In granting )itiT»itienf mi la\ni ol TWN ;md iijMiii'.l llie Miehels, Ihe lii.il * nut ' 
foiled to follow the prior directive of this Court in TWN I TWN did not present evidence 
that was "explicit and forthcoming" regarding Mi. rhri.siensmrs mieni in signing the 
1()S.S . ' .v-ihw - •;.. .. "trustee i>pcd J v i-.-. ... ugnature. or that proved that 
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Mr. Christenson had intended to convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as 
trustee of Cape Trust, and not his personal interest in the Property. The evidence 
presented failed to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae. 
The trial court committed reversible error in allowing Mr. Christensen to read his 
Affidavit into evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception to the hearsay 
rule, U.R.E. 803(5). The Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the events set forth 
therein took place, and therefore those events were not fresh in Mr. Christensen's memory 
at the time the Affidavit was signed as a matter of law. 
TWN claims that because the Michels did not object to the reading of the Affidavit 
immediately prior to it being read, they waived the right to appeal the trial court's 
decision on that issue. The record is clear, however, that the Michels objected to the 
reading of the Affidavit when the request was first made, specifically arguing that the 
Affidavit had not been made or adopted when the events referred to therein were fresh in 
the witness5 memory, as required by Rule 803(5). [R. 1379 at 18.] In so doing, the 
Michels preserved their right to appeal the trial court's ruling made thereafter, permitting 
the reading of the Affidavit. Moreover, even if it were determined that the Michels were 
required to object a second time to TWN's request that the witness be allowed to read the 
Affidavit into the record, the evidentiary ruling still may be reviewed on appeal, because 
in allowing the Affidavit to be read into evidence, the trial court committed plain error. 
The trial court's ruling that Mr. Christensen intended in 1985 only to convey to 
Zions his interest in the Property as trustee of the Cape Trust was based only on two items 
1 /C 
of e\ idence: (I) tl le c Dntent of the « \ffida\ it that was read into e\ idence and (2) the 
vajiue and condusnrv lestimni^ nf Mi ('hnslenson llul ' 's " (r, h K .pei ill. <iU " "."I 
li u-vi \"u. conveying (inaudible) signing it" and "You wouldn't put 'Trustee' in it if you 
were signing (inaudible)," [R. 1362 at 4,, 1j i r); P 1"7f ) it 7-° 1 Basing its decision solely 
<• • - . . h u ' jecision was against Uu cjcai A^ u rn oi \nc evidence 
ana wa^ ele vi 
Mr. Christenson's purchase of the Property at the Tax Sale to protect Zions ' 
interest in the Property; his conveyance of the Property to Zions in exchange for what he 
I" - * , • . ; company purchase the Property from Zions for a large 
sum ui iiiDi * • •• Zions, arid pledging the Pi opei t) to seci ii e tl le •' •• 
repayment oi^ the loan; and the lack of any claim to having an ownei&iu: ntoi 
Property on his 1987 Financial Statement or in the SLC T :iw suit demonstrate conclusively 
thai [ J i < iii'isleiisuii diJ not own, and did not believe he owned, any interest in the 
Property after he oxrculrd (lit I *>Sfc> 1 )cnl lo /mils' In in'V1 n! sin II mr iwl ie lming 
evidence, the trial court 's decision was clearly erroneous, and the judgment in \\w ot nl 
T W N should be reversed. 
r\ > s .! :, .ciusing iw , r.n.MviLi ..iv .'-I* iiv.1^ re^ judicata defense T^e 
SLC Lawsuit , holding that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in :hi : -n. 
The inal court also erred in i uline thai the Michcls did not raise their res judicata defense 
•.Ma ense was speciticaii\ iiwi^.,. in the Miche l s ' b r i e f on appeal. This 
-17 
Court did not address or dispose of that defense in TWNI. The trial court erred in failing 
to rule that TWN's claim to be the owner of the Property was barred by res judicata. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the Michels did not timely raise their defense 
that the Tax Sale was invalid and that the Tax Deed was void ab initio. The trial court 
erred in ruling that the invalid tax sale defense was disposed of on appeal in TWN I. The 
trial court also erred in holding that this defense was barred by the statute of limitations 
set forth in U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 through -5.3. 
A county does not have the authority to assess taxes against real property located 
in another county. A county also lacks authority to hold a tax sale of property located in 
another county upon non-payment of the assessed taxes. The sale of the Property by Utah 
County at the 1984 Tax Sale was invalid as a matter of law because it involved the sale of 
property located outside Utah County. The Tax Deed therefore was void ab initio, and 
the trial court erred in refusing to invalidate the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THIS COURT'S 
DIRECTIVE IN TWN I IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF TWN WHERE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DID NOT 
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE 
A. Under The Doctrine Of Descriptio Personam The Unexplained Use Of The 
Word "Trustee" On A Deed Does Not Implicate Some Unspecified Trust 
Interest But Operates As If The Word "Trustee" Were Not There, 
In TWN I, this Court explained the doctrine of descriptio personae in the context 
of a real property deed. Under this doctrine, the unexplained use of the word "trustee" on 
a deed does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, 
_1£_ 
cieale w Imsl oi implicate oith, a Imsl inleivsl lll'X I ill "'| I " A tiustci 's inlnil ID 
dispose of u us-
 V"M-—*-y " i n the name of the trustee as trustee" "must be made clraivi 
than. simpK placing the unadorned word 'trustee' after his or her name, A trustee-grantor 
should include on the deed such language as % my capacity as trustee for the XYZ 
personal interest, they must be explicit and forthcoming about this intention if the) hope 
to attain it." TIVN f i\\ n. 5 (emphasis added). 
B. Where Mr. Christenson Did Not Explain At Trial His Use Of The Word 
"Trustee" After His Signature On The 1985 Deed To Zions, The Deed 
Conveyed To Zions His Personal Interest Tn The Property, 
. Mr. Christenson did not include on tin; 1985 IXvd *• <• ^guagc 
suggesting thai h* - >w ^ n b e word "trustee" after his name was intended to signify that he 
was signing the deed on l idui: ui" some entity rather than in his personal capacity. Had 
h -*•'•:. .; :•-. : , •
 v ; . have and 
should have indicated on the deed that he was SM:*''•••;• 
entity. In failing to do so, the presumption of descriptio personae applies, and the 1985 
Deed to Zions operates as if the "vv oi d "trustee" were not there. See TWNIdX 14, 
In HVN I tlit* ( 'ourl stilt1*! thai altri n;ili\ v\\ ,i (mm I'. v\ ho signed a deed Ihal did 
not show that it was being signed h\ \hr person only in his or her capacit) r as trustee for a 
specific earned mi>i. but who clauns that he or she only intended to convey the interest of 
a spc\. * 11 trust. "may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, 
i 5,1 IOW e v ei , 1:1 lat si ich exti insic e\ idence must be 
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"explicit and forthcoming" about the person's intention in order to rebut the presumption 
arising under the doctrine of descriptio personae. See TWN I at n. 5. 
On remand, the trial court gave TWN the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence 
to show that Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions was different 
than it appeared on the face of the deed. TWN failed, however, to carry its burden of 
presenting "explicit and forthcoming" evidence establishing that, in signing the 1985 
Deed to Zions with the word "trustee" after his name, Mr. Christenson was intending to 
convey only his interest in the Property as trustee of Cape Trust. Mr. Christensen testified 
that he could not remember his intent at the time he signed the 1985 Deed to Zions, or the 
capacity in which he intended to sign that deed. [R. 1379 at 22, 28; R. 1380 at 14.] 
Given that testimony, and the lack of any other credible evidence in support of TWN's 
position, the presumption of descriptio personae continues to apply, and the deed 
operates as if the word "trustee" were not there. See TWNIat f 14. Thus, the trial court 
should have entered judgment in favor of the Michels, as required by TWN I, and erred in 
awarding judgment to TWN. 
C. The Trial Court Erred In Allowing Mr. Christenson To Read Into Evidence 
The Contents Of His Affidavit. 
1. The Trial Court Erred In Allowing The Statements In The Affidavit To 
Be Read Into Evidence As An Exception To The Hearsay Rule 
Pursuant To The Recorded Recollection Exception. 
Mr. Christenson was permitted to read into evidence at trial the Affidavit that he 
signed shortly after he executed the 1998 Deed to TWN. The trial court ruled that the 
_on_ 
Affidavit was nol ..u.u.i \:\ .^v ;. .\irsay rule pursuant to the recorded recollection 
exceptioi 1 foi i v e I Jtal 1 R i lies of E\ idence R 1 ik 803(5) states: • • 
A memorandum 01 record concerning a matter about which a u nness MIS- e 
had knowledge but n^w has insufficient recollection io enable the ^ itiu 
to testify fully and accurately, shown lo ha\ e been made o ulwpied h\ ? 
witness when the matter was fresh in the witnessf memory and to reflect 
that knowledge correctly \ If admitted, the memorandum or record may be 
read into evidence but may not itself be reeHv^! *•• <^ >>vK;Ht i j n | .^ ; s 
^rtor.vi iv. .r. .ah r^cjp partv. 
U.R.E. 803(5) (emphasis added). 
The Michels are not aware of any Utah appellate - <>ur t case that analyzes the 
recorded recollection exception to the hearsay ml* ^ : decisions interpreting the 
Evidence, vvhicli is identical iu kale 803(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as well a^  Liie 
views expressed in legal treatises on that hearsay exception, provide helpful insight into 
the mannei in w 1: iicli the I Jtah rule sin ..<!.. ^ inierpietci. .i.iw upp..*. J. 
recorded recolieciion exception, a showing is required that ^ ; Liu, vwuiess meiiior) ui the 
events detailed in the memwi.mdmn i> -sufficiently impaired; (2) the witness prepared K 
adopted the memorandum when the events were fi esh in the witness' memory ana t 
of the events. See Bank of Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, 168 F.Supp.2d 57, 62 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Fincher v. Cown(y of Westchester, 970 F.Supp. 989, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 
! '>") i he phrase "when the matter was frc.,;-. •> :i,e u nness' memory* " in Rule 803(5) 
? i 
has been interpreted by some courts to require that the memorandum be made or adopted 
"at or near the time of the event," see Parker v. Reda, CO., 327 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 
2003); or "contemporaneously with the event." Dickinson Supply, Inc. v. Montana-
Dakota Utilities Co., 423 F.2d 106, 109 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1970). Other courts do not apply 
such a strict rule, but give appropriate consideration to all pertinent facts, including the 
lapse of time, which reasonably and properly bear on the likelihood of the statement being 
an accurate recordation of the event to which the memory related. See U.S. v. Senak, 527 
F.2dl29, 141 (7th Cir. 1975). 
In McCormick on Evidence at 714, § 301 (2d ed. 1972), it states: 
The writing must have been prepared or recognized as correct at a time 
close to the event. Some opinions use the older strict formulation that 
requires Ihe writing to have been made or recognized as correct "at or near 
the time" of the events recorded. This finds some support in psychological 
research suggesting that a rapid rate of forgetting occurs within the first two 
or three days following the observation of the event. But the tendency 
seems to be towards acceptance of the formulation favored by Wigmore 
which would require only that the writing be made or recognized at a time 
when the events were fairly fresh in the mind of the witness. No precise 
formula can be applied to determine whether this test has been met; perhaps 
the best rule of thumb is that the requirement is not met if the time lapse is 
such, under the circumstances, as to suggest that the writing is not likely to 
be accurate. 
Regardless of which standard the Court endorses, Mr. Christenson should not have 
been allowed to read his Affidavit into evidence. The recorded recollection exception 
does not apply unless the document was prepared or adopted when the matter was still 
fresh in the witness' memory. See U.R.E. 803(5). In this case, it is clear that the large 
amount of time that elapsed between the signing of the 1985 Deed to Zions and the 
_??-
signing ol Atltt'liivil piccludcd (lie reading ol the Allul.A il into evidence at trial Where 
the Affidavit was signed fourteen \eais alier Ihe I'Wi 1 h ed to '/inns up.is signi d, iln 
Affidavit was not made or adapted when the matter was "fresh" in Mr. Christenson's 
memory as a matter of law 
The w* -( •*• -. ;uuu, . ...... .• - . ah envious purpose ^ -i-- . > 
m o r e likely that a docuiru:;• >. • • ; 
will be more accurate than if it is prepared fourteen years after the matter took place. 
Memories fade with the passage of time, and a person's ability to accurate]}' recall an 
evei it years aftei it occi -* -• suDstannany aimmi w.ev, ,j, ..»»ie; for a statemer* to h^ 
considered accurate and c11 m 
exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(5), it must have been made when the events 
referred to therein were "fresh" in the witness' memory. See I J..R..E. 803(5). 
The MiionuiL 101 mis rule is 10 insure the trustworthiness of the writing 
embodying die recollection by inquiring thai it must have been clearly and 
accurately remembered by the witness at the time of the making of the 
writing, since the validity of the content of the writing is ordinarily not 
subject lo "Hie test of Cross Examination 'on which our law places primary 
reliance for the ascertainment of truth.'" 
V \S. v / ; MC Corp., 306 F.Supp 1106, 113 7 (E.D.Pa. 1969), quoting 3 Wigmore on 
.Evidence, 74S ( |<>44 ml ) 
• *
s
 < hristenson claimed he had a recollection ef his intent m signing the 1^8: 
Deed to / ions at the time he signed the Affidavit, i N en \\ thai weio true, Rule 803(5) 
does not apply to a document that is shown lo ha\e been made or adopted by tlv witness 
when the matter was merely m the witness' memory. The rule requires that il K NIIOWU 
that the document was made by the witness wher :h<* 'vnttrr "was fresh in the w Mies^  
memory" U.R.li. 803(^0 <enniha<ds -.uhh-r 
-?.V 
The purpose of the hearsay rule is to preclude a class of evidence considered to be 
generally less reliable than in-person testimony of events observed by the testifying 
witness. U.S. v. Hernandez, 333 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2003); 2 McCormick on 
Evidence, § 245, at 93-96 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). Exceptions to the hearsay 
rule have been created where certain types of documents or statements exhibit sufficient 
guarantees of trustworthiness to justify their admission into evidence. See generally 
Hernandez, 333 F.3d at 1179; 2 McCormick on Evidence, § 253, at 126. 
The requirement under Rule 803(5) that the document be made or adopted when 
the matter is fresh in the witness' memory helps guarantee the trustworthiness of the 
document sufficient to justify it being read into evidence. It also properly balances the 
interests of both parties, and preserves the integrity of the judicial process. A witness 
who no longer can recall an event referenced in a document prepared by the witness may 
be permitted to read the document into evidence, thereby avoiding the hearsay rule, if the 
statement was made when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory. If the document 
was made years later, when the matter was not fresh in the witness' memory, the 
trustworthiness of the document is diminished, and the justification to permit the 
statement to be read into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule ceases to exist. 
Mr. Christenson's Affidavit was not made at a time when the signing of the 1985 
Deed to Zions was fresh in his memory. Thus, that statement is barred by the hearsay 
rule, and the trial court should not have allowed the statement to have been read into 
evidence as a hearsay exception under Rule 803(5). 
-94-
1 lie trial coin f s decision to allow the reading of the Affidavit was a legal ruling 
that was inconccf ,is A ni.ilti t n\ \AV I his enoi w ,is piriudiei.il, . 11 it I icquuvs (he tvw i ul 
of the judgment. I he statements that were i m p ' ^ ^ r l y allowed to be read into evidence 
provided the basis for the trial court's decision tha' Mi Hmstenson had intended to 
u*: •-• • / .*.>h;> mill \ Ins interest in the Property as trustee of the Cape Trust. In view of 
t h e p - ; * il I'll* i I ul (In h in.ii MIIMI i mil ii illinuiiif lln "\llnLn if !u be n"<nl nil" 
evidence, the judgment should be reversed. 
2 . The Michels' Right To Have The Trial Court's Evidentiary Ruling 
Under Rule 803(5) Reviewed On Appeal Was Preserved When Their 
Attorney Objected To The Affidavit Being Read Into Evidence, 
When TWN ; 
read Hie Aii idu. IL miu e\ idence pursuant lo the recorded recollection exceptio 
hearsay rule, the Michels ' attorney objected, arguinu tl»-:^ under Rule 803(5), TWN" had 
to show filial the A i 1 ida\ it uwas made or adopted b . m* witness when the matter was 
fresl ! in the witi less' memoi ) ," ai id tl mt tl le i\ ffida j it "cer tainl> v\ asn't i nade at or aboi it 
the time it was fresh in his mind." [R. 1379 at 18.] Following f u n l v -h ^ *•• 
the trial court and counsel, and voir dire of the witness, TWN's attorney again asked that 
Mr Christen be pei nutted to read the Affidavit into tl le record, and the trial court 
granted that request. [R 1379 i it 23 ] I VI 1" I iioi., ai giies 1 1 latbecai ise tl le Michels' 
attorney did not repeat his objection when TWN renewed its request to allow the w i t m ^ 
to read the Affidavit and the ii ial court granted the requeM. the Michels have waived the 
j u h -;H.:I . • u\. iAt.u: , tii.ii^. I hat argument i^  -• iih-nt merit. 
„"K 
An objection to the reading of the Affidavit was timely made on the ground that 
the requirement for allowing the recorded recollection exception had not been met. The 
Michels' attorney specifically stated that the Affidavit had not been made or adopted 
when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory, and therefore the Affidavit could not 
be read into evidence under Rule 803(5). The fact that he did not restate his objection 
immediately prior to the reading of the Affidavit does not change the fact that a timely 
objection was made, thereby preserving the Michels' right to appeal that ruling. 
3. The Court May Consider This Issue On Appeal Even If The Objection 
Was Not Properly Made Where The Reading Of The Affidavit 
Constitutes Plain Error. 
Even if it is determined that the Michels should have repeated their objection to the 
request to allow the witness to read the Affidavit at the time the trial court granted the 
renewed request, that would not preclude this Court from reviewing the evidentiary ruling 
on appeal. Although the general rule provides that an objection to the admission of 
evidence is waived if not timely raised, an appellate court is not precluded from 
considering the issue on appeal where the trial court committed plain error. State v. 
Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 9, 9 P.3d 164, 167. To establish plain error, it must be shown 
that (i) error was made; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable outcome was 
reasonably likely. Id. 
The elements required to establish plain error are present. An error was made in 
allowing the Affidavit to be read into evidence, and that error should have been obvious 
tin IIH" trial I (null 111 i rum vet ; liaimlul iiiili.il il piitudnl the basis lot the trial eouill's 
erroneous decision. Had the Affidavit not been reml wU\ n ulem* i|n Mii'lrK ffTf;unI\' 
would have had a more favorable outcome. That being the case, the trial court's ruling 
constitutes plain error, and this Court is permitted to review that ruling on appeal. 
4. The Coiielinsory Statements In The Affidavit Do Not Constitute The 
Type Of Extrinsic Evidence Necessary To Defeat The Presumption Of 
Descriptio Personae. 
In stating in TWNI that a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust 
\vac intended, u^ \ ourt cited to the Supreme Court decision in BnUc Cascade Corp », 
y *. * "* - • ; •! ,sarenineu.a:. stating 
that the Supreme Court in Boise Cascade was "surest! ' i u e unirr-,jMl,i ould 
have rebutted the presumptn »r of descriptio personae and shown thai luc descnpti\ c 
language was iniended to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than in his 
h .. •. H an •. v o: : • v. . and the trial court 
on the reference to counter-affidavits in liaise (V/vi ade .ind m HI 'V / w as misplaced. 
The trial =. • »urt ii i Boise Cascade granted summary judgment against a guarantor on 
his written guaranty. The guarantor had argued that he was not personally liable because 
he had placed tl ic « \ 01 d "^  7 Pi z s " aftei 1 lis signati n : « ::>i:i. tl le guaranty. In affirming the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment, me Mipreme Court stated: 
The terms of the guarantee are clear and unambiguous, and need m, paiol 
evidence to clarify. The terms arc also understandable as to scope and 
intention of the parties, and are of a dispositive nature It clearly is not co-
obligatory with the principal obligor. Stoncwood, Inn a promise standing 
alone and apart. The "V-Pres." follow ing appellant's signature on the 
agreenine ;. .P.IMM • .Ir^enp1*-^^ .*•.-»-;,*.;,,
 v MNnnac\ ~.,f t . r t*ar;u 
_?.7-
bind a different principal obligor; otherwise the liability would result in an 
absurdity, i.e., that the principal obligor also was the guarantor of his own 
obligation. 
The facts in this case are without dispute. Stonewood admittedly was 
indebted to plaintiff. Appellant admittedly guaranteed its payment, and 
there are no counter-affidavits that lend any doubt as to the fact of personal, 
not representative, liability. 
Boise Cascade, 655 P.2d at 669. 
The court's reference in Boise Cascade to the lack of counter-affidavits was a 
reference to the fact that the guarantor had failed to file any counter-affidavits in 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment. This statement did not establish a rule 
of law that a grantor of a real property deed could defeat the presumption of descriptio 
personae at trial through the use of a conclusory affidavit that lacks evidentiary 
foundation and is not supported by admissible facts. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an affidavit supporting or opposing a 
motion for summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, must set forth facts 
that would be admissible in evidence, and must affirmatively show that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. See U.R.C.P. 56(e).4 An affidavit that 
reflects merely the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions, conclusions or beliefs, lacks 
evidentiary foundation, or fails to state admissible facts must be stricken. See Luckett v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 R2d 1373, 1380 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980). 
"See also Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1979); Walker v. Rocky 
Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (1973); Western 
States Thrift and Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 60, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972). 
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} *- i-i . * , , . >nelusor\ * ,.. •. ., serving 
statement that he intended to sign tin* MJXS Dml In /ions ID his IM(»;H ilv ;i\ (tuslre ol 
Cape Trust. The Affidavit fails to provide, however, an)' evidentiary foundation or other 
admissible facts to support that statement, The Affidavit provides no information to 
suggest that Cape ' I i i ist 1 ic: Id an} interest in the Property at the time the 1985 Deed to 
Cape Trust. It does not explain why he would have transferred to Zions only Cape 
Trust's uitcrcst in the Property (which was nothing) when he had hought the Property at 
t.i i ! \ - . u; ; ; >, . . .,)[)cn> \\ ,; »es not 
explain wn / ! • -J : -
tax sale and then accept something less than Mr. Christenson s cntnc interest n* Jiu 
Property in return It fails to explain how Mr. Chrisfensrn was protecting Zions' interest 
in the IMupcil) h\ in onvcynij; (it /ions something less than his eniire interest in the 
PropertA 11 (ml.1 hirsplam ss In, Mi < 'hiist'Mison \MMIM (i;nr hit, i nin|Mii;\ pun, base (lie 
Property from Ziuiio m 1986 if Mr. Christenson already owned it. 
Since the Affidavit lacked evidentiary foundation, was conclusory and self-serving 
in iinlui'i", and ollict vvisr liulnl lo sadsly (lie requiremen: • -i ^.,k n, .. ihi in<i court 
er recj j n allowing it to be read into evidence at trial Becai lse tl le statements ai e 
insufficient as a mailer of law to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae, the trial 
court's entry of judgment in favor of TWN based thereon constitutes reversible error. 
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D. The Trial Court's Ruling That Mr, Christenson Signed The 1985 Deed To 
Zions Only As Trustee Of The Cape Trust Is Contrary To The Clear Weight 
Of The Evidence And Is Clearly Erroneous. 
Even if the trial court's action in allowing Mr. Christenson's Affidavit to be read 
into evidence did not constitute reversible error, the conclusory statements in the 
Affidavit are not dispositive on the issue of Mr. Christenson's intent when he signed the 
1985 Deed to Zions. Indeed, the statements in the Affidavit are nothing more than 
evidence to be considered. Moreover, where the statements in the Affidavit are 
inconsistent with all of the other evidence presented on the issue of intent, the trial court's 
ruling in reliance on the statements from the Affidavit was clearly erroneous. 
When challenging a trial court's findings, "[a]n appellant must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ^ j 15. 
There were only two items of evidence that supported the trial court's finding that Mr. 
Christensen intended in 1985 only to convey to Zions his interest in the Property as 
trustee of the Cape Trust: (1) the content of the Affidavit that was read into evidence [R. 
1379 at 24-25], and (2) Mr. Christenson's testimony that he would not have put the word 
"trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Deed to Zions if he intended to transfer his 
personal interest in the property. [R. 1362 at 4, ^ 19.] Basing its decision solely on these 
-^0-
t wo itei ns of e\ idei ice, the trial coin fs n ilii i..g was against the cleai weight of the e\ idence 
and. therefore clearly erroi leoi is :!) 
The evidence on the intent issue establishes that Mr. Christenson did not believe or 
understand what the statement in his Affidavit states - 'that in signing the 1985 Deed, to 
Zions, he was intending to convey only 1 lis interest in the Property as trustee of Cape 
protect Zions' interest in the Property, that he notified Zions of the action taken, and 
offered to convey the Property back to the bank. Zions reimbursed Mr. Christenson for 
the "n"ii . .. .„. . : , . . . , u.,;.,i„ n.v ,-Mipertv.it tU i<^ Sale in exchange for 
the ltX* !>• •: ' ' i ;1; in r .1 hal I\ Ir. 
Christenson's intent was only to transfer his interest in the Property as trustee of Cape 
Trust. This is puiCannrU tnu vxherc there is no evidence that Mi Christenson held, any 
inteiest as trustee ul the ('ape 'I rust in the Property at the time the l^s^ Deed to Zions 
was signed ': '• • - ' ' :; •' • 
One year later, Mr. Christenson caused his cunip: — to purchase the Property from.. 
Zions for a large sum of money, and took, out a loan to d< • so. If Mr; Christenson had. 
believ ed that he only had conv eyed Cape I r list s interest in the Property to Zions the year 
before, and that ^ i * . • s 
companx takeout i Kan h- Du> the Property from the bank. TWNI at 29n. 2. 
MUILIU • *« .'i<- a> .\ i iciKiuM; n is a summary of the evidence supporting and 
vu!ii;adicting 1 U \ ^ claim thai \ 1 K Christenson, in signing the 1()S5 Deed to / ions, 
intended on I v t< ^ - •• •*. hi— r, «•.• a r. tJ^ - Pv^ncvi^ ^ Tr.^-tr^ of r
 i p r !> . , . • 
Mr. Christenson's 1987 Financial Statement, which listed the significant assets 
owned by him at that time, did not show the Property to be owned by him. Such evidence 
further refutes the claim that Mr. Christenson did not intend to convey his personal 
interest in the Property to Zions in 1985. 
In 1996, Mr. Christenson filed the SLC Lawsuit against the Michels and others to 
foreclose what he claimed was a beneficial interest in a contract right in the Property. 
[Ex. 8 at 22.] He did not claim that he was the owner of the Property. Moreover, the 
court in the SLC Lawsuit ultimately held that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or 
interest to the Property, refuting TWN's claim that Mr. Christensen remained the owner 
of the Property after he executed the 1985 Deed to Zions. 
The Affidavit was signed shortly after the 1998 Deed to TWN was executed in an 
obvious attempt to create for TWN a claim of ownership in the Property that otherwise 
did not exist. The overwhelming evidence establishes, however, that Mr. Christenson did 
not own the Property, and did not believe that he owned the Property, prior to the time 
that he executed the 1998 Deed to TWN. The statement from the Affidavit that was read 
into evidence is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence and, if the statement from the 
Affidavit were allowed to control over such other credible evidence, it would "result in an 
absurdity." See Boise Cascade, 655 P.2d at 669. The trial court's ruling, based upon the 
statements from the Affidavit, is clearly erroneous, and should be reversed by this Court. 
The specific testimony upon which the trial court based its finding that Mr. 
Christenson would not have put the word "trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Deed to 
Zions if he intended to transfer his personal interest in the property does not support the 
finding. Mr. Christenson simply testified that "we try to be specific as to what trust I'm 
conveying (inaudible) signing it" and "You wouldn't put 'Trustee' in it if you were 
signing (inaudible)." [R. 1379 at 39.] Where Mr. Christenson could not recall his intent 
in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions, this vague, ambiguous and speculative testimony 
about what he usually did or might have done does not constitute evidence sufficient to 
refute the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER THE MICHELS' RES JUDICATA DEFENSE 
The trial court ruled that it could not consider the Michels' res judicata defense 
because this defense was not raised prior to the submission of the parties' motions for 
summary judgment, and therefore was barred pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine. 
[R. 1303 at 6.] The trial court further rejected this defense on the grounds that it was not 
raised or addressed in the prior appeal, and was not an issue that was remanded to the trial 
court for decision. [R. 1303 at 6.] Those rulings were incorrect as a matter of law. 
The res judicata defense did not exist, and therefore could not have been raised, 
prior to the submission of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Oral 
argument on the summary judgment motions was held on July 26, 2000. The trial court 
ruled on the motions from the bench. The written Order reflecting that decision was 
entered on August 24, 2000. [R. 240 at 1-2.] 
The Summary Judgment Order entered in the SLC Lawsuit on August 3, 2000, 
provides the basis for the res judicata defense. [R. 298.] This defense was raised on 
September 28, 2000, in connection with the Michels' motion for reconsideration. [R. 
338.] The Michels argued that TWN's claim of ownership to the Property was barred by 
res judicata based on the Summary Judgment Order entered in the SLC Lawsuit. [R. 360 
at 12-13.] TWN briefed the res judicata issue in its response to the reconsideration 
motion. [R. 441 at 9-11.] The trial court denied the motion without addressing the res 
judicata argument [R. 490 at 2], but the fact remains that this defense was raised by the 
Michels once the Summary Judgment Order was entered. 
The "law of the case" doctrine did not preclude the trial court from addressing the 
Michels' res judicata defense. Under this doctrine, a decision made on an issue during 
one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation. Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23,125, 70 P.3d 904, 912. This doctrine 
has no application in this case because the trial court never ruled on the argument that 
TWN's claim was barred by res judicata. [See R. 490 at 2.] 
In their docketing statement in the prior appeal, the Michels did not specifically 
identify the trial court's refusal to consider their res judicata defense as an issue for 
review on appeal. The docketing statement notified the Court, however, of the Summary 
Judgment Order in the SLC Lawsuit, and of the Michels' claim that this decision was res 
judicata on the main issues in this case. [R. 1162 at 7.] 
In their appeal brief, the Michels also informed the Court of the issue by stating: 
In addition, a ruling in the related and pending Salt Lake Lawsuit 
determined that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property at the time 
of the Deed to Appellee in December 1998. The lower court's ruling is 
1A_ 
inconsistent with prior court determinations affecting ownership of the 
Property. [R. 1140 at 9; Addendum F at 9.] 
A copy the Summary Judgment Order entered in the SLC Lawsuit was attached as 
an addendum to the Michels' appeal brief, and other references to the ruling in the SLC 
Lawsuit were made in that brief. [R. 1140 at 19 n. 10; Addendum F at 19 n. 10.] 
The res judicata defense admittedly was not addressed by the Court in TWN/, but 
it certainly was not rejected by the Court or disposed of on appeal. Instead, the Court 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, based on the doctrine of descriptio 
personae, and remanded the case to the trial court "for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion." TWN I at f 15. 
Following remand, the Michels argued before, during and after trial that TWN's 
action was barred by res judicata. [R. 975 at 6-8; R. 1380 at 117; R. 1267 at 3-8; R. 1296 
at 1-3.] The Michels also sought leave to amend the pleadings to formally add that 
defense. [R. 1380 at 123; R. 1267 at 5-6]. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to 
consider it. [R. 1362 at 7, ^  13.] 
The absence of the res judicata defense in the pleadings or the trial court's refusal 
to consider it does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue on appeal, particularly 
where the parties briefed and argued the issue below and manifest injustice would 
otherwise result. The Tenth Circuit has stated: 
In general, we will decline to consider issues first raised on appeal. Tele-
Communications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir. 
1993). This general waiver rule is not absolute, however, and "we may 
depart from [it] in our discretion, particularly when we are presented with a 
strictly legal question, the proper resolution of which is beyond doubt or 
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when manifest injustice would otherwise result." Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 
972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992); see Tele-Communications, Inc., 12 
F.3d at 1007 (one exception to general rule is "when the appellate court 
feels it must resolve a question of law to prevent a miscarriage of justice."). 
Although defendants have provided no explanation for why this issue was 
not raised below, we nevertheless reach its merits because it has been 
briefed fully by the parties and involves a pure legal issue . . . , and because 
of the important public policy concerns raised by the issue . . . ."). 
Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1997). 
The trial court's ruling that TWN is the owner of the Property totally contradicts 
the ruling in the SLC Lawsuit that held that Mr. Christenson, TWN's predecessor-in-
interest, had no right, title or interest in the Property. The issue created by this 
inconsistent ruling needs to be addressed to prevent manifest injustice. Where this claim 
was not addressed by this Court in TWN I, and clearly was raised and briefed in the trial 
court, the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to consider it, and that decision 
should be reversed. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF TWN WHERE TWN'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP 
OF THE PROPERTY WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct theories: claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion. Buckner v. Kennard, 2000 UT 78, ^  12, 399 P.3d 842, 846. Claim 
preclusion involves the same parties or their privies and the same cause of action. It 
precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that 
were, in fact, litigated in the prior action. Id.6 
6In contrast, issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, arises from a 
different cause of action and prevents parlies or their privies from relitigating facts and 
issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit. Buckner, 2004 UT 78, 
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In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, the party 
asserting the defense must satisfy each of the following three requirements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2004 UT 93, f 20; 16 P.3d 1214, 1219. 
All three elements necessary for the Michels' claim preclusion defense have been 
established. First, the SLC Lawsuit and this action involve the same parties or their 
privies. Mr. Christenson was the plaintiff in the SLC Lawsuit. TWN, which, claims title 
to the Property by reason of the 1998 Deed to TWN that was executed by Mr. 
Christenson, is Mr. Christenson's privy, and is the plaintiff in this action. The Michels 
were defendants in both actions. 
Second, TWN's claim of ownership to the Property in this action could and should 
have been raised in the SLC Lawsuit. Mr. Christenson alleged in his Complaint in the 
SLC Lawsuit that his interest in the Property was superior to that of the Michels and all 
other defendants, and he sought to foreclose their interests in the Property. TWN claims 
in this action that it is the owner of the Property and that the Michels have no valid 
interest in the Property. Both claims seek a determination of the parties' respective right, 
title and interest in the Property, and Mr. Christenson certainly could have, and clearly 
(cont'd) Tf 12. In effect, once a party has had his or her day in court and lost, he or she 
does not get a second chance to prevail on the same issues. Id. 
-17. 
should have, asserted any ownership interest that he claimed to have in the Property in the 
SLC Lawsuit. 
Third, the SLC Lawsuit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. The Third 
District Court entered summary judgment against Mr. Christenson, holding that he has no 
right, title or interest in the Property. That Summary Judgment Order was a final order. 
The Michels have established their claim preclusion defense as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Court should set aside the judgment entered by the trial court on the 
grounds that TWN's claim is barred under the claim preclusion doctrine. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER THE MICHELS9 DEFENSE THAT THE 
1984 TAX SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS VOID 
A. The Michels Did Not Waive Their Right To Challenge The Validity Of The 
1984 Tax Sale Based Upon Utah County's Sale Of Property Located In Salt 
Lake County, 
In its Complaint, TWN alleged that the Property was located in Utah County (and 
not partially in Salt Lake County), and that title to the Property should be quieted in 
TWN. TWN further alleged that the Tax Sale was valid and operated to extinguish any 
and all rights, title and interest of any parlies claiming interest in the Property, including 
Zions and the Michels, and that, because more than four years had elapsed since the Tax 
Sale, any action or defense challenging the Tax Sale was barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations contained in U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 - 5.3. [R. 9 at 3, ffif 9-11.] In their Answer, 
the Michels admitted that more than four years had passed since the Tax Sale, but 
generally denied that their challenge of the validity of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed was 
time-barred. [R. 13 at ffif 9-11.] 
At the time the parties filed their cross motions for summary judgment, they still 
erroneously believed that the Property was located entirely in Utah County. [See R. 158 
at 2; R. 199 at 2, f 1, R. 235 at 2, ^ 3.] The trial court granted TWN's summary judgment 
motion, subject to a determination on the Michels' adverse possession claim. By 
September 2001, the Michels had learned that part of the Subject Property was located in 
Salt Lake County, and therefore objected to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law submitted by TWN following the trial of the adverse possession claim on the basis 
that part of the Property sold at Tax Sale was in Salt Lake County. [R. 668 at 2.] The 
parties fully briefed the issue thereafter. [R. 752; R. 767; R. 778.] Nevertheless, the trial 
court refused to consider the issue on the merits, ruling that the defense had not been 
raised in a timely manner and, alternatively, was barred by the statute of limitations. [R. 
785 at 2-3.] 
The defense that the tax sale was void was not raised by the Michels in their 
Answer because it was not known to the Michels (or to TWN) that part of the Property 
sold by Utah County at the Tax Sale was located in Salt Lake County. The Michels raised 
that defense prior to the entry of a final judgment, and TWN had full opportunity to brief 
the matter. In view of these facts, the trial court erred in refusing to consider this defense 
on its merits on the ground that the issue had not been raised in a timely manner. 
B. This Issue Was Not Disposed Of By This Court In The Prior Appeal. 
In their first appeal, the Michels argued that the trial court erred in rejecting their 
defense that the 1984 Tax Sale was void ab initio because Utah County did not have the 
authority to sell at tax sale property located in another county. The Michels also argued 
on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that this defense was barred by the statute of 
limitations contained in § 78-12-5.1 - 5.3. [Addendum F at 19-26.] 
Following remand, the Michels again asserted this defense. [R. 952 at 11-27; R. 
975 at 8; R. 1380 at 123.] The trial court did not address the issue in its Ruling [R. 1303], 
but apparently decided that this defense could not be raised because it had been decided 
by the trial court prior to the first appeal, and was not an issue specifically remanded for 
adjudication in TWNL [See R. 1361 at 7,113.] 
This Court's decision in TWNI did not dispose of these issues. In that decision, 
the Court expressly stated: 
In addition to their principal argument in this case, Defendants argue that 
we should deem Utah County's 1984 tax sale void ab initio because, as it 
was discovered in about 1995, part of the parcel is in Salt Lake County. See 
note 1, supra. Given our decision, we need not address this argument. 
TWNIztSn/7.] 
The Court did not address the issue of the validity of the 1984 Tax Sale in the prior 
appeal. Given the fact that it was sending the case back to the trial court, it chose to defer 
any ruling on this issue. Its decision to defer ruling on that issue does not mean that the 
issue has been addressed or resolved. 
Where an appellate court remands a trial court's decision for further proceedings, 
determinations of law made at the appellate level become "law of the case" with respect 
to further proceedings. See Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. ofUtah, 2001 UT 75, \ 9, 31 
P.3d 543, 546. That principle does not apply in this situation, however, because this 
Court did not rule on the issue in TWNL 
The Court's statement at the conclusion of TWNI that "we reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion" did not dispose of the defense regarding the validity of the 
1984 Tax Sale that had been raised by the Michels in the prior appeal. Accordingly, the 
Court is warranted in addressing the trial court's refusal to consider this issue and in 
ruling that the Michels' right to challenge the validity of the Tax Sale in 1984 is barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
C. The Michels9 Invalid Tax Sale Defense Is Not Barred By The Statute Of 
Limitations Contained in § 78-12-5.1 Through § 78-12- 53 . 
The trial court determined that the four-year statute of limitations contained in 
§ 78-12-5.1 through § 78-12-5.3 barred the Michels' defense that the Tax Sale was void 
ab initio based on Utah County's lack of authority to sell property located in Salt Lake 
County. The trial court made this decision even though it is undisputed that Utah County 
and Salt Lake County did not learn until 1996 that part of the Property was in Salt Lake 
County, and that the parties did not learn of it until 2001. For the reasons set forth below, 
the trial court's ruling on this issue was incorrect, and should be overturned by the Court. 
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1. A County May Not Tax Or Sell At Tax Sale Real Property Located 
Outside Its Boundaries. 
Before addressing the statute of limitations issue, it is helpful to consider the 
ultimate question of whether a county can actually tax and sell real property located in 
another county, whether by mistake or otherwise. The statutes authorizing a county to 
assess taxes against real property limit the property being taxed or sold to property located 
"within the county."7 It is only this property that may be sold by the county at tax sale. 
In the case of Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 783 P.2d 1045 (Utah App. 
1989), this Court considered whether a county could validly sell at tax sale real property 
not located within the boundaries of the county. Baxter, 783 P.2d at 1046-47. The trial 
court granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT on the basis that the property in 
question was actually located in Weber County, not Davis County. This Court reversed, 
holding that the property actually was in Davis County and, therefore, the tax deed was 
not invalid. Baxter, 783 P.2d at 1055. The Court did not rule that this challenge of the 
validity of the tax sale, based upon the claim that Davis County had sold property outside 
7See, e.g., U.C.A. § 59-2-213 ("the [tax] commission shall prepare and furnish to 
each county an assessment roll in which the county assessor of each county shall list all 
property within the county") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-301 ("the county assessor 
shall assess all property located within the county which is not required by law to be 
assessed by the commission") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-303(1) ("prior to May 22 
each year, the county assessor shall ascertain the names of the owners of all property 
which is subject to taxation by the county . . .") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-325 
("the county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year, prepare from the assessment 
rolls of that year a statement showing the amount and value of all property in the county 
. . .") (emphasis added); U.C.A. § 59-2-1001 ("the county board of equalization shall 
adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within 
the county . . . .") (emphasis added). 
/to_ 
its boundaries, was barred by the statute of limitations contained in § 78-12-5.1 - 5.3. 
Had the statute of limitations been a bar to the jurisdictional challenge asserted in Baxter, 
the Court could have disposed of the case on that basis. It did not. 
It is clear that at a tax sale, a county may not sell real property located in another 
county. Such action would violate the express language of the applicable statutes, would 
be contrary to the intent of the taxing system in effect in Utah, and would not be 
statutorily or constitutionally permissible. Any sale of property located in another county 
is jurisdictionally invalid. 
In order for the Tax Deed issued by Utah County pertaining to the Property to be 
valid, all of the property covered by the Tax Deed must be located in Utah County. Utah 
County has no right or authority to sell property in an adjacent county, regardless of 
whether such a sale is done intentionally or by mistake. Where the Tax Sale in question 
involved the sale of property located in Salt Lake County, that sale is void ab initio, either 
in its entirety or as to the portion of the real property located in Salt Lake County. 
2. The Statute Of Limitations Does Not Apply To A Jurisdictionally 
Defective Tax Sale Of Property Located Outside The Boundaries Of 
The County Conducting The Sale, 
The trial court concluded that the Michels could not challenge the validity of the 
1984 Tax Sale because of the four-year statute of limitations contained in U.C.A. 
§ 78-12-5.1 through 5.3. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows: 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property 
or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or 
interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years 
from the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any 
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county, or directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private tax 
sale and after the expiration of one year from the date of this act. . . . " 
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.2. 
The term "tax title" . . . means any title to real property, whether 
valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, 
conveyance, or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding 
for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property whereby the 
property is relieved from a tax lien. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-5.3 (emphasis added). 
TWN argued before the trial court that this statute bars any challenge to a tax sale 
that is made more than four years after the sale, unless the challenger was in possession of 
the property within four years of the date of the tax sale. It relied upon several Utah 
cases which interpret this statute of limitations and bar untimely challenges to the 
procedural or technical deficiencies involved in those case.8 None of those cases, 
however, involved the sale by one county of property located in another county. 
In Shelledy v. Lore, the Supreme Court quoted the general rule set forth in 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah 1981), that "tax purchasers may avail 
8
 In Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), the defendant 
asserted that certain statutory steps were not followed, such as "failure to attach an 
auditor's affidavit to the assessment roll for the year the property was delinquent taxwise, 
failure to acknowledge the instruments, etc." Id. at 360-61. In Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 
632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), plaintiffs contended that the tax purchasers' tax title was 
invalid because the tax sale was conducted by an unqualified officer, whose appointment 
as deputy county auditor was not made in writing and filed in the office of the Salt Lake 
County Clerk and who had failed to take any oath of office as required by § 17-16-7." Id. 
at 828. In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 (Utah 1992), there were claims relating to the 
prior owner's federal sovereign immunity. Id. at 787. All were rejected by the appeals 
courts based on the statute of limitations. 
themselves of the special statute of limitation regardless of either the invalidity of their 
tax title or their inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax 
title." The court then specifically stated: 
We expressly reserved voicing any opinion "on whether the special statute 
of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by means repugnant to 
fundamental fairness or whether such an application of the statute would 
exceed the limits of statutory intent or constitutional permissibility. Id. at 
831 n. 14. 
Shelledy, 836 P.2d at 789. 
Where Mr. Christenson's tax title was obtained through the sale by Utah County of 
property located in Salt Lake County, the application of the statute of limitations to bar 
the Michels' challenge as to the validity of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed would "exceed 
the limits of statutory intent or constitutional permissibility" and should not be allowed. 
In Baxter, the plaintiffs sought to quiet title to the disputed property, basing their 
claim of title on a 1969 tax deed from Davis County. The defendants challenged the 1969 
tax sale on the ground that the property in question was located in Weber County at the 
time of the sale. The Court noted the general principle as follows: 
The strength and stability of title acquired by tax deed are aided . . . by the 
four-year statute of limitations barring untimely affirmative actions or 
defenses that challenge tax titles, [citations omitted], which applies even if 
the tax title is invalid." 
Baxter, 783 P.2d at 1047 n. 1. 
Nevertheless, the Court did not dismiss the defendants5 challenge of the validity of 
the tax sale on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred such a challenge, but 
rather focused on the question of whether the property was or was not in the county that 
had conducted the tax sale. 
A defect in or a violation of the procedure that is required under the statutes when 
conducting a tax sale is one thing. Statutes of limitation or repose may be enacted to 
prevent delayed challenges based upon such procedural or technical deficiencies. 
However, the sale of property not even located with the boundaries of the county that is 
conducting the sale is an entirely different matter. The sale of such property is not 
authorized by law, and therefore is void ab initio. Such a jurisdictional defect cannot 
later be ignored or validated simply because the sale of the property located outside the 
county's boundeiries was based on a good faith belief that the property was located 
entirely with the county. Such a sale exceeds the statutory and constitutional authority of 
the county, and violates due process. 
Consider a hypothetical case where a county auditor in Juab County mistakenly 
puts a legal description on a tax deed of property located in Washington County - more 
than a hundred miles away from its correct location. The tax sale is held, the deed is 
prepared and recorded, and no one is aware of the mistake for more than four years. The 
property which was mistakenly "sold" is not developed, and no one has any reason to 
know of the error. It cannot reasonably be argued that even though the property was not 
in Juab County, even though the sale of the property was a mistake, even though no one 
knew of the error and had no basis to object until long after the sale had taken place, and 
even though Juab County lacked the authority to make the sale, because no challenge was 
made to the sale within four years after the sale occurred, the statute of limitations bars 
such a challenge. Such a result would frustrate the title system in the State of Utah, 
would be contrary to the intent of the taxing statute, and would exceed the statutory or 
constitutional powers of Juab County. To say that such a result would be unfair and 
improper would be an understatement.9 
In the case before the Court, the Michels acquired the Property in 1993 pursuant to 
a foreclosure sale. At the time, no one had any reason to believe that the incorrect Tax 
Sale by Utah County nine years earlier could conceivably impact that portion of the 
Property located in Salt Lake County. Now, over a decade later, TWN argues that it has 
title to the Property, including that portion of the property located in Salt Lake County, 
because the passage of time somehow validates the improper sale in 1984 by Utah County 
of property that was not part of Utah County. 
This argument defies logic. It does not accomplish what the four-year statute of 
limitations was designed to accomplish. It contradicts the express purpose of having 
counties assess real property taxes on property located only in their respective counties, 
which the property tax statutes and the Constitution simply do not allow. 
9The Legislature has determined that in cases requesting relief from "mistake," the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of 
the facts constituting the . . . mistake." U.C.A. § 78-12-26(3). It was both unfair and 
incorrect for the trial court to apply the statute of limitations in circumstances involving 
the sale of real property located outside the county's boundaries until those claiming to 
own the property discovered the facts giving rise to their invalid tax sale defense. In this 
case, it was not known that part of the Property was located outside Utah County until 
after the commencement of this litigation. Accordingly, the cited statute of limitations 
should not be held to bar the Michels' challenge of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed. 
The statute of limitations in question expressly applies only to a "title to real 
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is dependent upon any 
sale, conveyance or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the 
liquidation of any tax levied against the property " U.C.A. § 78-12-5.3 (emphasis 
added). A county has no authority to sell at a tax sale property that is located outside of 
its boundaries and any such sale cannot be considered "a statutory proceeding" within the 
meaning of the statute. Such a defect is jurisdictional, the sale is void, and it is error to 
apply the statute of limitations to a challenge to such a sale. 
The trial court erred in ruling that the Michels are precluded from challenging the 
validity of the Tax Sale and the Tax Deed based on the statute of limitations in § 78-12-
5.1 - 5.3, and that ruling should be reversed. 
3. In Any Event The Language Of The Tax Deed Restricts Its Effect To 
Property Actually Located In Utah County. 
The Baxter case noted that the various deeds in question, after describing the 
subject property in metes and bounds, also described that property as being "in Davis 
County." That designation appears to have been important to the Court, as the remainder 
of the opinion analyzes and determines the county in which the property actually was 
located. 
The language of the Tax Deed in this case indicates that the property sold at tax 
sale was only that property lying within "Utah County." The Tax Deed recites: 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, 
Grantor, hereby conveys to RICHARD CHRISTENSON, Grantee, of 200 
South Main #1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, State of Utah the following 
described real estate in Utah County, State of Utah. [Ex. 1 (emphasis 
added).] 
The Tax Deed, by its express terms, limits the conveyance to property in Utah 
County. The mistaken belief that all of the property lay in Utah County doesn't magically 
make it so. It should be noted that the Tax Deed was not recorded in Salt Lake County -
illustrative that no one intended it to affect the Salt Lake County property. 
Even if the Court should find that the current statute of limitations prohibits any 
claim of invalidity of the Tax Sale or the Tax Deed, this Court is not prohibited from 
making a ruling that the express language of the Tax Deed applies only to property in 
Utah County. It was error for the trial court to ignore the language of the Tax Deed 
restricting its scope and effect to the property located in Utah County. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Michels respectfully request that the Court reverse 
the Judgment entered by the trial court, and enter judgment in favor of the Michels, 
quieting title to the Property in the Michels. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 2005. 
ET*jice J. Nelson 
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
Richard M. Hymas 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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59-2-213. Duty to furnish assessment roll to counties. 
(1) The commission shall prepare and furnish to each county an assessment roll in which the county 
sssor of each county shall list all property within the county. 
(2) In counties using computerized listings, the county assessor shall furnish the information required 
ler Subsection (1) pursuant to procedures established by the commission. 
tended by Chapter 3, 1988 General Session 
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59-2-301. Assessment by county assessor. 
The county assessor shall assess all property located within the county which is not required by law 
>e assessed by the commission. 
icted by Chapter 4, 1987 General Session 
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59-2-303.1. Mandatory cyclical appraisals. 
(1) Beginning January 1, 1994, each county assessor shall annually update property values of 
perty as provided in Section 59-2-301 based on a systematic review of current market data. In 
lition, the county assessor shall complete a detailed review of property characteristics for each 
perty at least once every five years. 
(a) The commission shall take corrective action if the commission determines that: 
(i) a county assessor has not satisfactorily followed the current mass appraisal standards, as provided 
law; 
(ii) the sales-assessment ratio, coefficients of dispersion, or other statistical measures of appraisal 
formance related to the studies required by Section 59-2-704 are not within the standards provided by 
rov 
(iii) the county assessor has failed to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1). 
(b) For purposes of this section, "corrective action11 includes: 
(i) factoring pursuant to Section 59-2-704; 
(ii) notifying the state auditor that the county failed to comply with the requirements of this section; 
(iii) filing a petition for a court order requiring a county to take action. 
(2) (a) By July 1, 1993, each county assessor shall prepare a five-year plan to comply with the 
uirements of Subsection (1). 
(b) The plan shall be available in the county assessor's office for review by the public upon request. 
(c) The plan shall be annually reviewed and revised as necessary. 
lended by Chapter 271, 1995 General Session 
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59-2-325. Statement transmitted to commission and state auditor. 
The county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year, prepare from the assessment rolls of that 
r a statement showing the amount and value of all property in the county, as classified by the county 
essment rolls, and the value of each class; the total amount of taxes remitted by the county board of 
lalization; the state's share of the taxes remitted; the county's share of the taxes remitted; the rate of 
mty taxes; and any other information requested by the state auditor. The statement shall be made in 
)licate, upon forms provided by the state auditor, and as soon as prepared shall be transmitted, one 
>y to the state auditor and one copy to the commission. 
lended by Chapter 86, 2000 General Session 
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59-2-1001. County board of equalization - Public hearings — Hearing officers — Notice of 
ision — Rulemaking. 
1^) The county legislative body is the county board of equalization and the county auditor is the clerk 
he county board of equalization. 
(2) The county board of equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of the 
[ and personal property within the county, subject to regulation and control by the commission as 
scribed by law. The county board of equalization shall meet and hold public hearings each year to 
mine the assessment roll and equalize the assessment of property in the county, including the 
sssment for general taxes of all taxing entities located in the county. 
(3) For the purpose of this chapter, the county board of equalization may appoint hearing officers for 
purpose of examining applicants and witnesses. The hearing officers shall transmit their findings to 
board, where a quorum shall be required for final action upon any application for exemption, 
erral, reduction, or abatement. 
(4) The clerk of the board of equalization shall notify the taxpayer, in writing, of any decision of the 
ird. The decision shall include any adjustment in the amount of taxes due on the property resulting 
tn a change in the taxable value and shall be considered the corrected tax notice. 
(5) During the session of the board, the assessor or any deputy whose testimony is needed shall be 
sent, and may make any statement or introduce and examine witnesses on questions before the board. 
(6) The county board of equalization may make and enforce any rule which is consistent with statute 
:ommission rule, and necessary for the government of the board, the preservation of order, and the 
isaction of business. 
lended by Chapter 227, 1993 General Session 
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U.C.A. § 78-12-5.1 through 5.3 
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78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession within seven years — Proviso — Tax title. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, unless 
plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed of such property within seven years from the 
nmencement of such action; provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or 
r^posed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real property 
inst the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or defense shall be commenced or 
rposed more than four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax 
s unless the person commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually 
upied or been in possession of such property within four years prior to the commencement or 
^position of such action or defense or within one year from the effective date of this amendment. 
Change Since 1953 
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78-12-5.2, Holder of tax title — Limitations of action or defense — Proviso. 
Nfo action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title or determine the 
lership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after the expiration 
bur years from the date of the sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly 
my other purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one year from 
date of this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar any action or defense by the owner 
he legal title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual 
session of such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or 
snse. And provided further, that this section shall not bar any defense by a city or town, to an action 
the holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against such property which is 
A or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax title. 
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78-12-53. Definitions of "tax title" and "action." 
;i) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and Section 59-2-1364, and the related amended 
tions 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real property, whether valid or not, which 
been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the 
rse of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property whereby the 
perty is relieved from a tax lien. 
[2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes counterclaims and cross-complaints and all 
il actions wherein affirmative relief is sought. 
Lended by Chapter 4, 1987 General Session 
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TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70; 
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West Reporter Image (PDF) 66 P.3d 1031, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2003 UT App 70 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Uwe MICHEL, an individual; and Ullrich Michel, an individual, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No.20010999-CA. 
March 13, 2003. 
Company to which quitclaim deed was executed, which occurred several years after the parcel 
was apparently purchased by another party, brought action to quiet title. The Fourth District 
Court, Provo Department, James R. Taylor, J., granted summary judgment for the company based 
upon its belief that the original purchaser had acquired only trust interest in the property, which 
actually did not exist. The original purchaser appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that 
although the deed conveying the property to the original purchaser referred to the grantor as 
"trustee," this unexplained reference did not mean the instrument conveyed only the grantor's 
trust interest. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Before JACKSON, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
** 1 This appeal involves an action to quiet title to an eighty-three acre parcel of land that lies 
along the border between Utah County and Salt Lake County. It turns on the sudden appearance 
in a chain of title of * 1032 the term "trustee.11 We reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the parcel at issue in this case. However, 
Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on the land, so Utah County sold the 
parcel at a tax sale in 1984. [FN1] Richard Christenson purchased the property at the sale, and 
accordingly he received title to the parcel. The grantee on the deed was listed as "Richard 
Christenson.'1 
FN1. Utah County sold the entire parcel, even the portion in Salt Lake County, because at the 
time of the sale, it was thought the entire parcel was within Utah County. Not until 
approximately 1995, when a new survey was conducted, was it discovered that part of the parcel 
was actually in Salt Lake County. 
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**3 In 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing of record, Mr. Christenson executed a 
quitclaim deed to the parcel to Zions Bank, which reimbursed him the amount he paid at the tax 
sale. The grantor was identified on that deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." Zions Bank 
sold the land to Franklin Financial, a corporation that was wholly owned by Mr. Christenson, in 
1986. Zions Bank financed this sale, and when Franklin Financial defaulted on its mortgage 
payments, Zions Bank held a foreclosure sale on the land. Defendants were the high bidders at 
the foreclosure sale, which took place in 1993, and received an appropriate deed in due course. 
**4 However, in 1998, Mr. Christenson executed another quitclaim deed for the parcel, this time 
to Plaintiff. The grantor named on this deed was "Richard A. Christenson." 
**5 In 1999, Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title on the parcel. Both sides moved for 
summary judgment, and the trial court granted it in Plaintiffs favor. The trial court's order does 
not explain the rationale underlying its decision. However, the parties agree that its rationale was 
that because the 1985 deed to Zions Bank was signed "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee " 
(emphasis added), the deed did not convey Mr. Christenson's personal interest in the property, 
which was the interest he had acquired at the 1984 tax sale. Rather, as a matter of law the 1985 
deed conveyed only whatever interest Mr. Christenson held on behalf of an unnamed trust, which 
was apparently nothing. [FN2] Defendants now appeal the grant of summary judgment. 
FN2. At oral argument both sides agreed that Mr. Christenson likely did not actually hold any 
interest in the property on behalf of a trust. No explanation was offered as to why Mr. 
Christenson would cause a corporation he owned to acquire title to the property from Zions Bank 
for a considerable sum if he believed Zions had actually bought nothing from him and thus had 
nothing to convey to the corporation. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] **6 "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because entitlement to summary 
judgment is a question of law, we accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal 
issues presented." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1995) 
(citations omitted). Thus, "[o]ur inquiry on review of a summary judgment is similar to the 
inquiry conducted by the trial court: are there material issues of fact to be litigated, and did the 
trial court correctly apply the governing law?" Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 
P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987). 
**7 To determine whether "the trial court correctly appl[ied] the governing law" in this case, id., 
we must answer the following question: Does a grantor's unexplained placing of the word 
"trustee" next to his or her name on a real property deed result, as a matter of law, in a 
conveyance of only a trust interest? As explained below, we answer that question in the negative. 
[FN3] 
FN3. Lest the reader be tempted to view this as a "notice" case, wherein a subsequent bona fide 
purchaser for value takes title if they record their deed first, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 
(2000), we clarify that such an issue is not present in this case. The disagreement in this case 
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concerns what interest the 1985 deed conveyed-Mr. Christenson's entire interest or only his 
"trustee" interest. No one 
disputes that Defendants, who are the successors in interest to the first purchaser (Zions Bank) 
and who properly recorded their deed, are the rightful owners of whatever interest the 1985 deed 
conveyed. 
* 1033 ANALYSIS 
[2] **8 Although Defendants argue in general terms that the unexplained appearance of the 
word "trustee" creates ambiguity on the face of the deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank, the 
thrust of their argument brings them within the doctrine known as "descriptio personae." This 
term is defined as "the use of a word or phrase merely to identify or point out the person intended 
and not as an intimation that the language in connection with which it occurs is to apply to him 
only in the technical character which might appear to be indicated by the word." Dann v. Team 
Bank, 788 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex.App.1990). See also Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Peck, 195 
Cal.App.3d 803, 240 Cal.Rptr. 911, 913 (1987) ("' "Where a writing in the nature of a contract is 
signed by a person, and contains apt words to bind him personally, the fact that to such signature 
is added such words as 'trustee,1 'agent,1 'treasurer,' 'president,' and the like does not change the 
character of the person so signing, but is considered as merely descriptive of him."'") (quoting 
Ricker v. B-W Acceptance Corp., 349 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir.1965) (quoting Ellis v. Stone, 21 
N.M. 730, 158 P. 480, 483 (1916))); Klutts Resort Realty, Inc. v. Down'Round Dev. Corp., 268 
S.C. 80, 232 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1977) (defining "descriptio personae " as "a term descriptive of the 
person rather than the relationship in which he signs the agreement"); 14 Richard R. Powell, 
Powell on Real Property § 81A.04[l][a][iv][E], at 81A-42 (Michael Allan Wolfed., 2002) 
(describing "descriptio personae " as "[c]ertain terms sometimes added to a person's name [that] 
are merely descriptive matter intended to clarify the identity of the person, but... their use or 
non-use should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance"). 
**9 The Utah Supreme Court validated the descriptio personae concept for Utah courts in Boise 
Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). In that case, a 
Stonewood corporate officer who had signed a loan guaranty agreement as "Vice President" 
sought to absolve himself of personal liability on the guaranty agreement. He claimed that since 
he had written the words "Vice President" next to his signature on the agreement, his signature 
was in a representative capacity and bound only the corporation and not him personally. The trial 
court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the creditor, and the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed. The Court held: 
The "V-Pres." following [the officer's] signature on the agreement is a matter of description 
(descriptio personae), not of capacity to bind a different principal obligor.... Stonewood 
admittedly was indebted to Plaintiff. [The officer] admittedly guaranteed its payment, and there 
are no counter-affidavits that lend any doubt as to the fact of personal, not representative, 
liability. 
Id. at 669. Accord Appliance & Heating Supply, Inc. v. Telaroli, 682 P.2d 867, 868 & n. 1 (Utah 
1984). Utah courts have held similarly on other occasions as well. See, e.g., Proctor v. Insurance 
Co., 714 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Utah 1986) (holding that an accident insurance company properly paid 
decedent's second wife rather than his first wife because even though the second marriage was 
illegal, the " 'designation [in the insurance policy] as the wife of insured is descriptive only, and it 
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is immaterial whether or not she is ... his lawful wife'") (quoting 46 C.J.S. Insurance § 1160 
(1946), which is updated with slightly different language at 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1419 (1993)); 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485-86 (Utah 1975) (holding that a father's 
divorce-decree mandate to name his "three minor children" as contingent beneficiaries in a life 
insurance policy did not expire when the children reached adulthood because the "minor 
children" designation "was merely descriptive of their status at the time [and] was not meant to 
make them contingent beneficiaries only during their minority"); Southwick v. Leone (In re 
Estate of Leone ), 860 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that language identifying the 
beneficiary of a pay-on-death account as the "spouse of the protected person" did *1034 not 
create a condition precedent that the spouse remain married; rather, the phrase was "merely a 
non- restrictive adjective phrase meant to identify the individual"). 
[3] ** 10 It has long been recognized that the concept of descriptio personae applies to the 
identification of parties on real property deeds. See, e.g., Molina v. Ramirez, 15 Ariz. 249, 138 P. 
17, 19(1914) ("The description of the grantor as the 'administratrix[ ] ' . . . may be treated as 
descriptio personam, and of no effect. She acted, so far as her interest in the property was 
concerned, in her individual capacity when she executed the deed."); Hodgson v. Dorsey, 230 
Iowa 730, 298 N.W. 895, 896-98 (Iowa 1941) (holding that the word "trustee" next to a grantee's 
name on a deed was descriptio personae and citing various cases that held similarly); Owen v. 
Ellis, 64 Mo. 77, 88 (1876) (holding that the word "executrix" appearing next to the grantor's 
name was "mere descriptio personae, mere surplusage, and the conveyance would operate as well 
without [it] as with [it]"). 
[4] ** 11 As for the question of whether the unexplained placement of the word "trustee" on a 
real property deed may rightly be categorized as descriptio personae, almost every court that has 
addressed this issue has addressed it in the context of the word appearing next to the grantee's 
name, not the grantor's name as in our case. See, e.g., Hodgson, 298 N.W. at 895; Gammarino v. 
Hamilton County Bd. of Revision, 84 Ohio St.3d 155, 702 N.E.2d 415,416 (1998) (per curiam). 
Therefore, the question that most courts have confronted is whether the deed created a trust and 
vested title in the grantee only as a trustee or whether it vested title in the grantee personally. 
Such courts have almost universally held that the word "trustee," absent other circumstances, 
does not create a trust, but rather constitutes descriptio personae and conveys title to the grantee 
personally. See, e.g., Hodgson, 298 N.W. at 896-98; Gammarino, 702 N.E.2d at 417-18 (relying 
partially on state statutory law but also on case law). See also Powell, supra, § 
81 A.04[l][a][iv][F], at 81A-42 ("Most often the incidental and unexplained use of such terms as 
'trustee' or 'agent' is ... considered to be merely descriptio personae and is insufficient to establish 
or create a trust or agency."). But see Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 623 S.W.2d 942, 948 
(Tex.App.1981) (holding that a deed created a trust, in part because the property was conveyed to 
a named trustee but also because multiple extraneous factors so suggested). 
[5] ** 12 The case at hand is slightly different from the opinions just cited because in our case it 
is the grantor, not the grantee, who is designated as "trustee." However, this distinction is 
immaterial. We see no logic in categorizing as descriptio personae the word "trustee" if it follows 
a grantee's name but giving the word enforceable meaning if it follows a grantor's name. 
Regardless of whose name the word follows, the principle must be the same: The unexplained 
use of the word "trustee" on a real property deed does not, absent other circumstances suggesting 
the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest. Therefore, in 
both contexts, the deed should be read and interpreted as if the word "trustee" were not there. 
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** 13 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, the only court of which we are aware that has 
recently faced the precise issue that we face today, came to the same conclusion. In Terry v. 
Zaffran, 483 So.2d 526 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), review denied, 492 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1986), a property 
owner named Michael A. Taylor conveyed a parcel of land, signing the deed "Michael A. Taylor, 
as trustee." Id. at 527. Title to the parcel followed a chain subsequent to that deed, and the land 
was eventually mortgaged to appellant. Some months later, appellee obtained a judgment against 
Taylor. Appellee then "became the grantee of a sheriffs deed issued pursuant to a levy on the 
land to satisfy the judgment." Id. When appellee brought an action against appellant, the 
mortgagee, to quiet title to the property, the trial court ruled in appellee's favor, holding that since 
"Michael A. Taylor held title as an individual, the deed from him 'as trustee' was ineffectual to 
convey title to the [first purchaser]." Id. Thus, the trial court held that Taylor's personal interest in 
the property remained with him until appellee took it by virtue of the sheriffs deed. See id. 
Predictably, the appellate court reversed and held as follows: 
The addition of the words "as trustee" to the name of the grantor Michael A. Taylor *1035 was 
merely "descriptio personae" of the person of the grantor and, as such, did not affect the validity 
of the conveyance of the interest held by the grantor nor did it limit the estate conveyed. In 
Florida today those words alone do not even charge a subsequent good faith purchaser or lender 
with the duty to inquire as to the rights of undisclosed trust beneficiaries and can be safely 
disregarded as surplusage. Accordingly, Michael A. Taylor having effectively conveyed all of his 
interest in the land in question prior to the date of the judgment against him, that judgment never 
became a lien on the land previously owned and conveyed by the judgment debtor. Thus, the 
sheriffs deed was invalid and had no effect on the lien interest held by appellant as mortgagee. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
[6] ** 14 Finally, we note that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(5) (1993) authorizes a trustee to 
dispose of trust property "in the name of the trustee as trustee." [FN4] In fact, that is exactly what 
Plaintiff claims occurred in the present case. However, we hold that a trustee's intent to do so 
must be made clearer than simply placing the unadorned word "trustee" after his or her name. 
[FN5] A trustee-grantor should include on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee 
for the XYZ trust." [FN6] Alternatively, as the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Boise Cascade 
Corp., a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended. See 655 
P.2d at 669 (suggesting that a counter-affidavit could have rebutted the presumption of descriptio 
personae and shown that the descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his 
representative capacity rather than in his individual capacity). Otherwise, the presumption of 
descriptio personae will apply, and the deed will operate as if the word "trustee" were not there. 
FN4. Although this subsection was not enacted until 1992, see Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402 
amendment notes (1993), it is relevant to our decision today regarding the 1985 deed that Mr. 
Christenson conveyed to Zions Bank. The subsection specifies that it "applies to a trustee's 
exercise of trust powers both prior to and after the effective date of this subsection." Utah Code 
Ann. §75-7-402(5) (1993). 
FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-409(2) (Supp.2002) provides: "If the terms of the trust are not 
made public [in a grant of real property to a person as trustee], a conveyance from the trustee is 
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absolute in favor of purchasers for value who take the property without notice of the terms of the 
trust." That statute is not directly applicable to the present case because this case does not involve 
the situation anticipated by the statute, i.e., that "title to real property is granted to a person as 
trustee." Id. § 75-7-409(1). Even so, our decision today is consistent with the statute's spirit: 
When parties wish to convey a trust interest, 
as opposed to a personal interest, they must be explicit and forthcoming about this intention if 
they hope to attain it. 
FN6. This phrase is intended only as an example of language that would be effective. We have 
no intention of resurrecting the long-deceased requirement that certain, precise phrases must 
appear on a deed to convey a particular interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-2 (2000) ("The term 
'heirs,' or other technical words of inheritance or succession, are not requisite to transfer a fee in 
real estate."); Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 354, 85 P.2d 861, 864 (1939) ("We are not interested 
in the use of terms but we are in concepts, relationships and legal rights which for convenience 
are often described by the use of legal names or expressions."). 
CONCLUSION 
**15 We hold that the word "trustee" appearing next to Mr. Christenson's name on the 1985 deed 
to Zions Bank was not sufficient, by itself, to restrict the conveyance only to whatever interest 
Mr. Christenson held in trust. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [FN7] 
FN7. In addition to their principal argument in this case, Defendants argue that we should deem 
Utah County's 1984 tax sale void ab initio because, as it was discovered in about 1995, part of 
the parcel is in Salt Lake County. See note 1, supra. Given our decision, we need not address this 
argument. 
**16 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, Presiding Judge, and PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2003. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TWN. INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990402593 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before The Honorable Fred D. Howard, Judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, on August 3 and 31, 2004, 
upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals (TWN, Inc. v. Michel. 2003 UT App 70, 66 P.3d 
1031 (2003)). Plaintiff TWN, Inc. was represented by its counsel of record, Vincent C. Rampton 
and Ross 1. Romero of Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC. Defendants Uwe and Ullrich 
Michel were represented by their counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson of Nelson Christcnsen & 
Helsten. 
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The Court having heard the testimony of parties and witnesses, proffers of counsel, 
having reviewed the file, pleadings and submittals, heard and considered argument of counsel, 
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing, enters the following findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, order, and judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
2. Defendants Uwe ("Shaun") Michel and Ullrich {"OHie") Michel are individuals 
and residents of the State of Utah. 
3. The real property which is the subject of this action consists of approximately 83 
acres of land located in the area commonly known as Traverse Ridge, more particularly described 
as follows: 
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast comer of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; 
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
("Subject Property \) 
4. As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the Subject Property, 
5. In 1984, however, Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on 
the Subject Property. 
6. In May of 1984, therefore, Utah County conducted an auditor's tax sale on the 
Subject Property for delinquent taxes. 
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7. The Subject Property was purchased at the tax sale by Richard A. Christenson as 
the successful bidder. 
8. An Auditor's Tax Deed dated June 29, 1984, was issued and recorded with the 
Utah County Recorder on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588, 
9. The named grantee on the 1984 Tax Deed was "Richard Christenson"; this 
Richard Christenson and Richard A. Christenson are one and the same person, however. 
10. On September 12, 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing of record, 
a March 19, 1985 Quit-Claim Deed describing the Subject Property and a separate parcel of 
property in Salt Lake County, and naming Zions First National Bank as grantee, was recorded 
with the Office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. 
11. The grantor on the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank was identified as 
"Richard A. Christenson, trustee." 
12. Zions Bank then sold whatever interest it held in and to the Subject Property to 
Franklin Financial in 1986, taking back a Trust Deed thereon. 
13. Franklin Financial thereafter defaulted on payments to the Zions Bank, resulting 
in the conducting of a non-judicial foreclosure sale on April 13, 1993. 
14. Defendants Uwe and Ullrich Michel were the high bidders at the trustee sale. 
15. Defendants received a trustee's deed following the sale, which described both the 
Subject Property and a separate parcel in Salt Lake County. 
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16. Richard A. Chrisienson executed the March 19, 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, and 
delivered the same to Zions Bank, in his capacity as trustee for Cape Trust, a trust of which he 
was sole trustee. 
17. The purpose of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was to transfer the interest, if any, of 
Cape Trust in and to the property described in the Quit-Claim Deed, including the Subject 
Property. 
18. It was not Mr. Christenson's intent or purpose, in executing the March 19, 1985 
Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank, to convey any personal interest in and to the Subject Property, 
as evidenced by the fact that the description on the Quit-Claim Deed includes other properties. 
19. The fact that Mr. Christenson executed the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank 
in his capacity as trustee for the Cape Trust, rather than in his personal capacity, is further 
indicated by the following: 
a. The content of an affidavit executed by Mr. Christenson and dated 
January 14, 1999, wherein Mr. Christenson averred that he reviewed the 1985 Quit-Claim 
Deed to Zions Bank, and that "he signed said Quit-Claim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust 
to transfer the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in the Subject Property, and not any personal 
interest in the Subject Property"; and 
b. Mr. Christenson's testimony in court that he would not have put the word 
"trustee" next to his name on the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed if he intended to transfer his 
personal interest in the property. 
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20. On December 9, 1998, Richard A. Christenson gave a Quit-Claim Deed to 
Plaintiff TWN, Inc., describing the Subject Property, which was recorded in the Office of the 
Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845. 
21. The 1998 Quit-Claim Deed was executed by Richard A. Christenson, with no 
indication thereon that he was not conveying in his individual capacity. 
22. Mr. Christenson executed the December 8, 1998, Quit-Claim Deed with the 
intent, and for the purpose, of conveying his personal interest in and to the Subject Property to 
TWN, Inc. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4. 
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties as residents of the state of Utah. 
3. Venue is properly in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah Count)', 
State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1. 
4. This matter was remanded for trial by the Utah Court of Appeals on the sole issue 
of whether, in executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, 
trustee", Richard A. Christenson intended to sign as trustee of the Trust, thereby intending to 
convey the Trust's interest in the Subject Property, or whether he intended to convey his own 
personal interest, adding the term "trustee" to his signature merely as descriptiopersonae. 
5. Under the Court of Appeals' ruling, a grantor's execution of an instrument of 
conveyance as "trustee/' without further explanation, raises the presumption that the word 
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"trustee" was included merely as descriptio personae, and that the grantor is presumed to have 
intended conveyance of his/her personal interest in the property being conveyed; however, this 
presumption may be overcome either by identification, in the instrument of conveyance itself, of 
the trust on behalf of which the conveyance occurs, or by other extrinsic evidence. 
6, As the Court is satisfied, based upon the evidence presented, that Richard A. 
Chrislenson intended to execute the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed as trustee for Cape Trust, and that his 
intent was to convey Cape Trust's interest in and to the Subject Property thereby, the 
presumption of descriptio personae is overcome. 
7, As such, the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed conveyed to Zions First National Bank only 
such interest as Cape Trust held in and to the Subject Property at that time. 
8. As of March 19, 1985, Cape Trust had no interest in and to the Subject Property; 
rather, as of that time, fee simple title in and to the Subject Property was vested in Richard A. 
Christenson, individually, by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed. 
9, Title therefore remained vested in Richard A. Christenson, individually, until 
Decembers, 1998. 
10. The Quit-Claim Deed executed by Mr. Christenson on that date, and delivered to 
TWN, was sufficient to transfer title to the Subject Property from Mr. Christenson to TWN. 
11. Since December 8, 1998, fee simple title in and to the Subject Property has 
remained vested in TWN. 
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12. Defendants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel received no right, title, or interest in 
and to the Subject Property pursuant to the April 13, 1993 Trustee's Deed from Zions First 
National Bank. 
13. All issues of fact and law previously raised by the parties in this action, other than 
those addressed above, have been resolved in this case by prior proceedings, were either 
not challenged on appeal or were not included by the Court of Appeals as part of this Court's 
mandate on remand, constitute law of the case, and need not be addressed again herein. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as on prior 
proceedings in this case (including prior findings of fact and conclusions of law entered 
following the first trial of this matter on March 27, 2001, partial summary judgment as entered 
herein, and the ruling of the Court of Appeals referenced above), this Court enters the following 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT: 
1. That title be and hereby is quieted in Plaintiff TWN, Inc. in and to the following 
parcel of real property, located in Utah and Salt Lake Counties, State of Utah: 
COMMENCING at a point West 1979 feet from the Northeast comer of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; 
thence North 2630.3 feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. That TWN, lnc.'s title to said property is held free and clear of any claim of right, 
title, interest or encumbrance by or through Defendants Uwe Michel and/or Ullrich Michel. 
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3. That the lis pendens filed in connection with this litigation be and hereby is 
released. 
4. That costs be awarded to Plaintiff TWN, lncM and against Defendants Uwe Michel 
and Ullrich Michel, by separate ordei upon application by Plaintiff TWN, Inc. under Rule 54(d), 
Utah R. Civ. P.. and that this judgment may be hereafter supplemented in accordance therewith. 
5. That the parties bear their respective attorneys' fees. 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this &T2 day of Noysmber, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ J & £ f f i ^ 
IJred D. Howard/District Judg<( r 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
NELSON CHR1STENSEN & HELSTEN 
By:. 
Bruce J Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT^ 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT was hand 
delivered this 15* day of November, 2004, to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Nelson, Rasmussen & Christensen 
68 South Main, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
/ / 
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Trial court's prior "Ruling" 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Stat© of Utah 
_ufs/ot ftfr
 nApi l ty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case # 990402593 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
Division 5 
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth 
District Court Judge, on August 3 and 31, 2004. Originally, Judge Taylor granted summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff, which was reversed and remanded by the Utah Court of Appeals. See 
TWN, Inc. v. Michel, 2003 UT App 70,66 P.3d 1031. On remand, the sole factual issue before the 
Court is whether, in executing the 1985 quitclaim deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, 
Trustee," Mr. Christenson intended to sign as trustee of a trust, thereby intending to convey the 
trust's interests in the subject property, or whether he intended to convey his own personal interest, 
adding the term "trustee" to his signature merely as "descriptio personae." Other issues previously 
raised by the parties have either been tried to this Court or rendered moot by the Court of Appeals' 
decision. 
The Court having heard the testimony of the parties, proffers of counsel, having reviewed 
the file and pleadings, and being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing 
therefrom, hereby issues the following: 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Plaintiff TWN, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Defendants Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel are individuals and residents of the State 
of Utah. The real property which is the subject of this action (subject property) is primarily located 
in Utah County, with a small portion in Salt Lake County, consisting of 83 acres. It was thought that 
the entire parcel was within Utah County until 1995, when a new survey was conducted, it was 
discovered that part of the parcel was actually in Salt Lake County. 
As of 1984, Zions Bank was the record owner of the subject property at issue in this case. 
However, Zions Bank became delinquent in paying its property taxes on the land, so Utah County 
sold the subject property at a tax sale in 1984. Richard Christenson purchased the property at the 
tax sale, and accordingly he received title to it. The grantee on the deed was listed as "Richard 
Christenson." 
In 1985, without any intervening transaction appearing on record, Mr. Christenson 
executed a quitclaim deed to the subject property to Zions Bank, which reimbursed him the amount 
he paid at the tax sale. The grantor was identified on that deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." 
Zions Bank sold their interest in the deed to Franklin Financial, a corporation that was wholly owned 
by Mr. Christenson, in 1986. Zions Bank financed this sale, and when Franklin Financial defaulted 
on its mortgage payment, Zions Bank held a foreclosure sale on the subject property. Defendants 
Page 2 of 7 
were the high bidders at the foreclosure sale, which took place in 1993, and received an appropriate 
deed in due course. 
In 1998, Mr. Christenson executed another quitclaim deed for the subject property, this 
time to Plaintiff. The grantor named on this deed was "Richard A. Christenson." In 1999, Plaintiff 
brought this action to quiet title on the subject property. Both sides moved for summary judgment, 
and Judge Taylor granted it in Plaintiffs favor finding that the 1985 deed conveyed only whatever 
interest Mr. Christenson held in behalf of an umiamed trust, which was apparently nothing. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of Mr. Christenson's intent, 
holding "that a trustee's intent to [dispose of trust property] must be made clearer than simply 
placing the unadorned word 'trustee' after his or her name." TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at ^J14. The 
Court of Appeals directed that intent can be shown by the trustor-grantor "including] on the deed 
such language as 'in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ trust'" or by "resort[ing] to extrinsic 
evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended." Id. 
RULING 
The Court notes that the sole issue before it is whether Mr. Christenson, in executing the 
1985 quit-claim deed to Zions Bank as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee," intended to convey the 
trust's interests or his personal interest in the subject property. See TWN, 2003 UT App 70 at f^ 15. 
The Court of Appeals found that the "unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed 
does not, absent other circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or 
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implicate only a trust interest." 7<i. atf 12. The Court of Appeals thenheld that a trustee may dispose 
of trust property by including on the deed such language as "in my capacity as trustee for the XYZ 
trust" or in the alternative, "a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, 
intended." Id. at \ 14. The Court of Appeals cited to Boise Cascade Corporation v. Stonewood 
Development Corporation, 655 P.2d 668,669 (Utah 1982), wherein it was suggested that a counter-
affidavit may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae by showing that the 
descriptive language was intended to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than his 
individual capacity. Id. 
In citing Boise Cascade Corp., the Court of Appeals suggests that an affidavit explaining 
the use of the term "trustee" may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of descriptio personae if the 
affidavit shows that by using the term "Trustee," Mr. Christenson intended to restrict the conveyance 
only to the interest he held in trust and that he retained any personal interest he held in the property. 
At trial on remand, Plaintiff offered language from an affidavit of Mr. Christenson, signed 
and dated January 14,1999, wherein Mr. Christenson averred that he reviewed the 1985 quit-claim 
deed to Zions Bank, and that "he signed said Quit Claim Deed as Trustee for Cape Trust to transfer 
the interest, if any, of Cape Trust in subject property, and not any personal interest in subject 
property." Mr. Christenson testified that he could not recall the circumstances surrounding his 
signing of the 1985 quit claim deed, but he testified that he was the sole trustee of Cape Trust and 
that he would not have put the word "trustee" next to his name if he intended to transfer his personal 
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interest in the subject property. Mr. Christenson also testified that it was not his custom to use 
"trustee" unless he was signing as a trustee. 
Defendants argued that Mr. Christenson's actions in a prior lawsuit, wherein he attempted 
to foreclose a lien against the subject property but never claimed a personal interest in the property, 
demonstrate that he had no remaining interest in the property. Considering the testimony of Mr. 
Christenson and all the evidence before the Court, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendants' 
argument. 
Following the direction and mandate from the Court of Appeals, the Court finds that the 
language of Mr. Christenson's affidavit and his testimony are dispositive of the issue as framed by 
the Court of Appeals. The Court is persuaded by such evidence that he was acting on behalf of Cape 
Trust when executing the quit claim deed. The evidence further proves that Mr. Christenson retained 
any personal interest which he held in and to the property after execution of the 1985 quit claim deed 
and that the only interest transferred in the quit claim deed was that of Cape Trust. Moreover, the 
Court is persuaded by Mr. Christenson's testimony that he would not have signed as "trustee" unless 
he was acting in behalf of Cape Trust. 
The Court, therefore, finds that the proper and legal chain of title continued with Mr. 
Christenson until 1998, when he conveyed his personal interest in the subject property to Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an order of this Court quieting title in and to the property, free 
and clear of any claim of right, title or interest of Defendants. 
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Defendants assert that Plaintiffs claim is barred by claim preclusion resulting from a final 
order entered in the Third District Court. However, at the conclusion of the submission of the 
parties' motion for summary judgment pleadings, the pleadings were closed as to such arguments; 
and, therefore, pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine, this Court is bound by previous decisions 
in prior stages of this litigation. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). The 
issue of claim preclusion not having been raised, the Court of Appeals did not address the issue and 
remanded this case on the sole issue as outlined above. Respectfully, the Court will not, therefore, 
reconsider this issue when Defendants should have previously raised it. 
Counsel for Plaintiff is directed to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
an Order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this f?^ day of November, 2004. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah. Appeals from final decisions can be made as a matter of right to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)0 of the Utah Code Annotated. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court on December 5, 2001. On February 26, 2002, and pursuant to 
§ 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court exercised its discretion to transfer 
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Was the trial court in error in refusing to consider parole evidence to interpret the 
terms of an ambiguous Quit-Claim Deed? This is a question of law and should be 
reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".1 
B. May a county assess taxes on real property located in an adjacent county and hold a 
tax sale following non-payment of the assessed taxes? This is a question of law and 
should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of "correctness".2 
C. Was the trial court in error in applying a four-year statute of limitations to a 
jurisdictional challenge to a Tax Deed issued by Utah County when mistakenly and 
erroneously selling real property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah? This is 
1
 Upon review of a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) No deference is accorded the trial court's 
ruling and legal conclusions Transamenca Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 
789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990) 
2
 See footnote 1. 
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a question of law and should be reviewed by this Court under a standard of 
"correctness" 3 
RULES RELEVANT FOR REVIEW 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating to summary judgment is relevant to 
the issues of this appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The underlying issue of this case is a determination of the actual owner of a tract of eighty-
three (83) acres of undeveloped real property located at the top of the mountain (sometimes known 
as Traverse Ridge) between Draper and Highland cities The property lies partially in both Salt Lake 
and Utah counties (Addendum G, R 755 ) 
Appellants acquired ownership of the property in 1993, having purchased the same at a 
foreclosure sale held by Zions Bank Appellees claim ownership of the property pursuant to a 1998 
Quit-Claim Deed from Richard A Christenson (Addendum C ) 
The root of title flows from the effect of a 1984 Tax Deed from Utah County following a tax 
sale of the property (Addendum A) 
On July 16,1999, Appellee filed an Action to Quiet Title in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County seeking a declaration of such court that Appellee was the owner of the property 
under its 1998 Quit Claim Deed (R 9) Appellants defended the action by alleging their ownership 
pursuant to the 1993 foreclosure sale and resulting Trustee's Deed (R 15, 326) 
3
 See footnote 1 
2 
The predominant issues in this case are: (1) whether the lower court should have considered 
parole evidence to clarify the effect of an ambiguous or incomplete 1985 Quit Claim Deed executed 
by "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions Bank and (2) the questioned validity of an 
erroneous 1984 tax sale by Utah County, Utah County had mistakenly assessed and sold real property 
actually located in Salt Lake County at the tax sale. In the lower court, Appellants asserted that the 
1984 tax sale by Utah County of property located in Salt Lake County was jurisdictionally invalid. 
(R. 767.) 
At a hearing on cross-motions for Summary Judgment, the lower court refused, sua sponte, 
to consider parole evidence to ascertain the true grantor of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, signed by 
"Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". As a result, the court ruled that the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed 
executed by Richard A. Christenson was invalid and that his 1998 Deed properly vested fee title to 
the Property in the name of Appellee. (Addendum R) 
The lower court further ruled, on summary judgment, that a four-year statute of limitations 
on tax sales prohibited any review of the validity of the tax sale in 1984, holding that any mistake by 
Utah County in assessing and selling Salt Lake County property was not "jurisdictional". (Addendum 
H,R. 785.) 
Appellants have appealed both rulings, asserting that the 1985 Quit Claim Deed was inherently 
ambiguous on its face and requires parole evidence to clarify the real grantor thereof (R. 73.) 
Accordingly, summary judgment was inappropriate because questions of fact exist as to the intention 
of the grantor designation. Further, Appellants have appealed the lower court's ruling that the 1984 
tax sale of Salt Lake County property by Utah County is inherently defective due to jurisdictional 
defects. Accordingly, Appellants allege that the cited statute of limitations on tax sales is inapplicable 
to these facts. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 The real property ("Property") subject to this appeal consists of a parcel of 
undeveloped land located in an area located between Draper and Alpine, Utah, sometimes known as 
"Traverse Ridge" and more recently "South Mountain" (R 234 ) 
2. In 1984, the record owner of the Property was Zions First National Bank (R 300, 
366.) 
3. The Property consists of approximately 83 acres (R 234, 755, Addendum G) The 
Property is located partially in both Salt Lake and Utah Counties Of the Property, 77.224 acres is 
located in Utah County and approximately six (6) acres of the Property is located in Salt Lake 
County (Addendum G, R 755 ) 
4. Prior to 1985, the Utah County Assessor mistakenly believed that all of the Property 
was located in Utah County As a result, Utah County incorrectly assessed taxes on the entire parcel 
of land, even though some of the Property was partially located in Salt Lake County (R 754, 
Addendum G.) 
5. Due to delinquent taxes, Utah County scheduled the Property for tax sale to be held 
in May 1984 (R 754, Addendum G) 
6. Richard A Christenson was an individual involved with the Traverse Mountain project 
for many years - a project consisting of approximately 4,000 acres of land located adjacent to the 
Property (R 234) 
7 On the day of the scheduled tax sale, Mr Christenson discovered that the Property 
owned by Zions Bank was scheduled for tax sale by Utah County Apparently, Zions Bank was 
unaware of the sale (R 233, 315 ) 
4 
8. Mr. Christenson had a good relationship with Zions Bank due to prior business 
dealings and wanted to protect the bank at the sale "because that is the type of relationship we felt 
we had with Zions". (R 314.) 
9. Mr. Christenson purchased the Property at tax sale from Utah County for the sum of 
$1,297.93. (R. 733, Addendum A.) 
10. Mr. Christenson later received a Tax Deed from Utah County. The grantee was 
"Richard Christenson". Such Tax Deed was dated June 29,1984, and recorded in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder on July 18,1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588. (Addendum 
A, R.233). 
11. Mr. Christenson subsequently got reimbursed by Zions Bank for the monies advanced 
at the tax sale. (R. 300, 351.) 
12. Mr. Christenson then executed a Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank. The Quit-Claim 
Deed was dated March 19, 1985, and was recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on 
September 12, 1985, as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. The grantor of the Quit-Claim 
Deed was "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". (Addendum B.) 
13. Zions Bank later sold the Property4 to Franklin Financial, a company wholly owned 
by Mr Christenson. Zions Bank financed the purchase and took a Trust Deed to secure the same. 
(R 297, 300, 305.) 
14. The obligations of Franklin Financial to Zions Bank later fell into default, and the 
bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. At a foreclosure sale held on April 14,1993, Appellants were 
the successful purchasers of the Property. (Addendum D.) An agent of Mr. Christenson attended 
4
 Other property not relevant to this case was included in the transaction. 
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the foreclosure sale, made an initial bid, and observed that the Appellants were the successful bidders. 
(R. 298, 312.) 
15. As a result of the sale, Appellants received a Trustee's Deed dated April 14, 1993. 
The Trustee's Deed was subsequently recorded in the offices of the Salt Lake and Utah County 
Recorders. (Addendum D.) 
16. Since acquiring the Property in 1993, Appellants have treated the Property in all 
respects as their own. (R, 132, 295.) 
17. Presumably because the Property was increasing rapidly in value and in order to add 
it to other properties in the Traverse Mountain development, in March 1996, Mr. Christenson filed 
a lawsuit in the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 960902187, 
styled Richard A. Christenson v. Uwe Michel, et al (the "Salt Lake Lawsuit"). Mr. Christenson 
sought to obtain the Property by foreclosing a purported 1978 Assignment of Contract in his favor 
which he claimed encumbered the Property.5 (R. 309, 310.) 
18. During depositions in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, Mr. Christenson testified that he knew 
of no interest he held in the Property, other than his Assignment of Contract interest. (R. 310, 311.) 
19. None of Mr. Christenson's financial statements of that period showed any ownership 
interest in the Property. (R. 303, 318.) 
20. During the mid 1980's, Mr. Christenson held any interests he claimed in real estate in 
various trusts he had established for holding ownership thereof. (R. 300.) 
5
 The property subject to such lawsuit included the Property subject to this action Over 200 
defendants (R. 310) were named as parties to such action (Addendum E, R. 293). In the Salt Lake 
Lawsuit, no claim was made that Mr. Christenson owned the Property, only that he claimed a lien 
against the same. 
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21. The Salt Lake Lawsuit was primarily funded for Mr. Christenson by his neighbor and 
friend, Chuck Akerlow. Mr. Akerlow participated in decisions of strategy in the Salt Lake Lawsuit. 
(R. 303.) 
22. After two and a half years of unsuccessful litigation by Mr. Christenson in the Salt 
Lake Lawsuit, one or more members of Mr. Akerlow's family, among others, formed a new 
corporation on December 7, 1998, known as TWN, Inc, the Appellee herein. (R. 357.) The next 
day, on December 8,1998, Mr. Christenson signed a Quit-Claim Deed to the Property to TWN, Inc. 
The grantor of the Quit-Claim Deed was "Richard A, Christenson". The Quit-Claim Deed was 
later recorded in the office of the Utah County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 
132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845. (Addendum C.) 
23. Appellee then initiated this action in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
on July 16,1999, seeking to quiet title to the Property pursuant to the December 8,1998, Quit-Claim 
Deed. Appellee asserted that the 1985 Quit Claim Deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank was 
defective and failed to transfer Mr. Christenson's fee interest received from the earlier Tax Deed from 
Utah County. (R. 9.) 
24. Appellants answered, asserting ownership of the Property by virtue of the Trustee's 
Deed of April 14, 1993, asserting the validity of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr. Christenson to 
Zions Bank from which Appellants' title descends. (R. 15, 326). 
25. Both Appellee and Appellants filed cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 46, 
62.) 
26. At oral argument on July 26,2000, the lower court ruled that the parole evidence rule 
prohibited the consideration of extrinsic evidence to clarify the intent of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed 
from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee". Accordingly, this Court found that Richard Christenson 
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had never individually divested himself of the title acquired by virtue of the 1984 Tax Deed and that 
title thereby transferred to Appellant pursuant to the 1998 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr Christenson 
(Addendum E.) 
27. The parole evidence rule had not been raised, nor briefed, by either of the parties prior 
to the hearing - the same being raised sua sponte by the Court His written Order was signed 
August 3, 2000. (R. 356, Addendum F.) 
28. In the meantime, Judge David Young in the Salt Lake Lawsuit had ruled on June 2, 
2000, that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property. His written Order was signed August 3, 
2000. (Addendum E.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER PAROLE 
EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE MEANING OF AN AMBIGUOUS OR INCOMPLETE DEED 
The "parole evidence rule" provides that extrinsic evidence should not be used to alter or 
amend the meaning of documents which are complete within the four corners of the document. 
However, where documents are incomplete or ambiguous, parole evidence is appropriately 
considered to clarify (but not alter) the intent of the document. 
The document in question in this case is a 1985 Quit-Claim Deed executed by "Richard A 
Christenson, Trustee". It is impossible to tell who the grantor is of such Deed. Parole evidence is 
not only appropriate, but necessary, to clarify the incompleteness and ambiguity of the Deed. 
The lower court improperly refused to consider parole evidence in this case Other courts in 
similar situations have considered extrinsic evidence to ascertain the proper identity of the intended 
grantor. Proffered parole evidence in this case conclusively proves the intent of the parties and does 
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not alter or amend the incomplete document. The lower court's refusal to consider parole evidence 
resulted in a decision totally contrary to the intent of the Deed. It also had the effect of ignoring/ 
overruling fifteen (15) years' of real estate transactions affecting the Property. 
The Court improperly granted Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee because questions of 
fact exist in the case. 
In addition, a ruling in the related and pending Salt Lake Lawsuit determined that Mr. 
Christenson had no interest in the Property at the time of the Deed to Appellee in December 1998. 
The lower court's ruling is inconsistent with prior court determinations affecting ownership of the 
Property. 
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
TO A JURISDICTIONALLY INVALID TAX SALE 
A county may not tax, nor sell at tax sale, real property located in an adjacent county. Case 
law is dispositive on this issue. Statutory authority also prohibits such a sale. Any such sale in 
violation of such statutes and existing case law is jurisdictionally deficient and void ab initio. 
The lower court erred in ruling that such a situation was not "jurisdictional" and that a four-
year statute of limitations period prevented Appellants from challenging the defective tax sale. The 
tax sale, being held contrary to statute, is not a "statutory proceeding", and the cited statute of 
limitations is not applicable. Alternatively, the statute of limitations should only start to accrue when 
the "mistake" was discovered. 
Finally, the language of the Tax Deed itself restricts its effect to property actually located in 
Utah County. Any deed purportedly conveying property which lies in Salt Lake County is ineffective 
and invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER 
PAROLE EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THE MEANING 




THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE 
A. General Rule. 
The Utah Court of Appeals set forth the general rule disallowing parole evidence in construing 
a deed when it said: 
"When a deed is plain and unambiguous, 'parole evidence is not admissible to vary its 
terms' " Gillmore v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995), 
B. Exceptions to General Rule in Case of Ambiguities in a Deed. 
It is likewise understood that an ambiguous document, or deed, needs explanation which the 
four corners of the document cannot provide In such cases, parole evidence is not only permitted 
but expected. The following statements from Utah courts confirm such exception to the general rule* 
" . . . when a contract provision is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than 
one reasonable interpretation due to uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or 
other facial deficiencies, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the intent of the 
parties" WiHard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 
1995) (emphasis added). 
"Contract language may be ambiguous if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms 
used to express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more 
plausible meanings." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 
1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added). 
"A nonintegrated contract may exist where the terms are not ambiguous, but the 
nature of the agreement itself is unclear (citation omittedO Only when contract terms 
are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the judge on a 
motion for summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 
(Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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"It is the general rule that if an agreement is ambiguous because of lack of clarity in 
the meaning of particular terms, it is subject to parole evidence as to what the parties 
intended with respect to those terms (citations omitted). We hold that that rule also 
applies where the character of the written agreement itself is ambiguous even though 
its specific terms are not ambiguous." Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Brothers 
Constructions Co., 731 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). 
"Note that although parole evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the clear and 
unambiguous terms of an integrated contract, parole evidence is admissible to clarify 
facial ambiguity.'5 UnionBankv. Swenson, 707P.2d 663,665 (Utah 1985) (emphasis 
added). 
"It is also well known that the intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to 
interpretation only when the words used are ambiguous." Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have been consistent in allowing extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous documents.6 
n. 
THE 1985 CHRISTENSON 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED IS 
AMBIGUOUS "ON ITS FACE" 
The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" is ambiguous on its face. 
It cannot be determined who the grantor is from the document itself. What trust is Mr. Christenson 
the trustee of? There is nothing on the Deed to answer that question. 
During a 1998 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the related Salt Lake Lawsuit, he was asked 
that very question (R. 301): 
Q . . . what Td like to have you tell me is why did you sign it as trustee? 
A I can't answer that. 
Q What were you the trustee of in the year 1985? 
6
 Although not relevant to real estate transactions, but for comparison, the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code has codified the parole evidence rule in commercial transactions at § 70 A-2-202, 
Utah Code Annotated, evidencing the legislature's philosophy about parole evidence. Such statute 
provides that "contracts . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented . . . ( b ) by evidence of 
consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete 
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement" (emphasis added). 
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A Well, the one thing that comes to mind is I was trustee of Cape Trust but I've 
also been a trustee of a number of trusts, family and otherwise I can't answer 
your question 
Mr Christenson further testified (R 300) 
Q Other than your miscellaneous family trusts and Cape Trust, can you think of 
any trust that you were a trustee of in 1985? 
A PTA Trust 
From Mr Christenson himself, we know that he was the trustee of several trusts in 1985 
How can one know from the Deed itself which trust, if any, he intended to be the grantor? Mr 
Christenson, the man who signed the Deed, was then asked that very question, when he stated 
(R 300) 
Q Can I tell from this document or can you help from looking at this document 
if there's anything on it that will help me understand what trust it is you're 
referring to when you say Richard A Christenson, Trustee? 
A No, I can't 
The lower court ruled that the parole evidence rule prohibited the consideration of extrinsic 
evidence to clarify the meaning of the incomplete or ambiguous grantor designation on the 1985 Quit-
Claim Deed, presumably finding that such designation was not incomplete, nor ambiguous 7 The 
lower court declined to consider Mr Christenson's sworn deposition testimony from the Salt Lake 
Lawsuit 
7
 The lower court's ruling was made in the face of contrary expert testimony An affidavit 
of an experienced title examiner was submitted to the lower court (R 364), indicating that the grantor 
description on the 1985 deed was incomplete and ambiguous from a title examination standpoint 
The lower court apparently disagreed, or ignored, such expert opinion 
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m. 
PAROLE EVIDENCE IS APPROPRIATE 
TO CLARIFY AMBIGUITIES 
IN THE 1985 CHRISTENSON 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Inasmuch as the grantor of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed cannot be determined from the deed 
itself, parole evidence is appropriate to clarify the intent of the Deed. As generally observed by one 
commentator: 
"Extrinsic evidence is generally admissible to identify the person or persons intended 
to be designated by the name used for the grantor in a deed. Thus, extrinsic evidence 
is admissible to identify a grantor who executed the deed under an assumed name..." 
23 Am. Jr. 2d, Deeds, Section 40, page 103 (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have stated in similar situations: 
"As in all parole evidence cases, oral testimony may not be admitted to vary or 
contradict the terms of a document; however, it is admissible to clarify the meaning 
of ambiguous provisions. The turnout areas shown on the plats do not clearly or 
obviously portray their purpose. It was therefore proper to admit evidence to clarify 
the intended purposes and uses of these particular areas. The testimony did not 
contradict or change anything depicted on the plat and was therefore not in violation 
of the parole evidence rule." Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners1 Association, 
656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
In a similar case involving uncertainty of the grantor listed only as "trustee", a Missouri court 
has said: 
"The grantee designated in the deed was "Donald Penrod, Trustee." These words 
created a latent ambiguity as they failed to designate beneficiaries of the trusts. In 
resolving latent ambiguities in deeds, the intent of the parties, primarily that of the 
grantor, is determinative and dispositive, which intent is determined, not only by the 
terms of the deed itself, but by the surrounding circumstances and conditions as well." 
Penrodv. Hemy, 706 S.W. 2d 537, 540 (Mo.App. 1986) (emphasis added). 
"A latent ambiguity in the description of land in a deed or mortgage is an uncertainty 
not appearing on the face of the instrument, but which is shown to exist for the first 
time by matter outside the writing, when an attempt is made to apply the language to 
the ground. Such an ambiguity, it is practically agreed by all the cases, may be 
explained and removed by parole evidence; having been revealed by matter outside 
the instrument, it may be removed in the same manner". Becker v. Workman, 
530 S W.2d 3, 6 (Mo.App. 1975). 
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"There appears to be no question that a latent ambiguity is presented with respect to 
the intended grantee in the two quitclaim deeds It is said that 'a latent ambiguity 
arises when the writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but there is some 
collateral matter which makes the meaning uncertain' And it is well established 
that parole or other extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain or clarify a latent 
ambiguity" Gibson v. Anderson, 92 So.2d 692, 694 (Ala 1956) (emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the Tax Deed transferred title to "Richard Christenson" (Addendum A) 
The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was from "Richard A Christenson, Trustee" (Addendum B ) Finally, 
the 1998 Quit-Claim Deed went from "Richard A_ Christenson". (Addendum C ) Usage of a middle 
initial can also create an ambiguity which should be explained through parole evidence Another 
court has held. 
"The erroneous use of the middle initial 'J ' created a iatent ambiguity ' A latent 
ambiguity is an uncertainty which does not appear on the face of the deed The 
ambiguity is created by matters outside the writing An ambiguity of this nature may 
be explained and thus removed by clear evidence " Kratzer v. Kratzer, 595 S W 2d 
453, 455 (Mo App 1980) (emphasis added) 
In the instant case, extrinsic evidence will not vary or contradict the deed It will solely clarify 
what was intended by explaining a term that is ambiguous - either because it is an obvious ambiguity 
or a latent ambiguity As explained by the Utah Supreme Court 
"There was here no attempt to vary or contradict the terms of the deed The deed, 
while conveying appurtenances as a matter of law, was nevertheless silent as to just 
what the appurtenances were There was a latent ambiguity in the deed in this respect 
which was a proper subject of explanation, even by parole testimony " Wade v. 
Dorms, 173 P. 564, 565, 52 Utah 310 (1918) (emphasis added). 
Or, as another Court has stated. 
"If the true owner conveys by any name, the conveyance, as between the grantor and 
grantee, will transfer title, and in all cases evidence aliunde the instrument is 
admissible to identify the actual grantor The admission of such evidence does not 
change the written instrument or add new terms to it, but merely fixes and applies 
terms already contained in it" Walter v. Miller, 54 S E 125,127 (No Carolina 1905) 
(emphasis added) 
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Due to the ambiguous grantor designation contained in the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed ("Richard 
A. Christenson, Trustee"), the court should consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the intent thereof 
IV. 
THE OBVIOUS INTENT OF 
THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED WAS TO 
DIVEST OWNERSHIP FROM 
RICHARD A, CHRISTENSON8 
By way of proffer of proof, Richard A. Christenson has explained on three separate occasions 
what he intended in giving a deed to Zions Bank9: 
In a 1987 deposition of Mr. Christenson in an unrelated case, he stated (R. 314, 315): 
A . . . Fm furnishing you an exhibit that shows the payables. And I noticed one 
of those to Zions Bank for $284,000. That's a piece of property that Zions 
financed for one of these Myron Child related investors. And Zions Bank had 
neglected, they foreclosed on the property and neglected to pay the taxes on 
it. We were at the sale and tried to reach Zions Bank and couldn't reach 
anyone with the authorization. We paid the taxes, bought that property and 
presented it to Zions and it's worth $284,000. But that is the kind of 
relationship we felt we had with Zions. (Emphasis added.) 
In a 1997 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, he stated (R. 351): 
A . . . that we had picked up when one of our employees was at the Utah 
County Courthouse at the time of the tax sale and we were making certain 
that all of the taxes were paid on the full contract portion. That parcel was in 
the name of Zions Bank solely and we tried to contact Mr. Noel Bennett. He 
wasn't in. My employee, Mr. Merlin Hanks, had cashiers checks and I told 
him to go ahead and to take care of the taxes which he did and we were later 
reimbursed by Zions Bank and entered into a contract with them and that is 
the parcel that you're referring to. (Emphasis added.) 
8
 It is more than obvious that Mr. Christenson believed he had transferred title pursuant to the 
1985 Quit-Claim Deed and that he had no fee ownership of the Property because in 1996 he filed the 
Salt Lake Lawsuit (Civil No 960902187) alleging a "lien", not fee title, against the Property 
Nevertheless, his own testimony confirms such fact, as set forth in this section. 
9
 The lower court refused to consider the cited deposition testimony and further refused to 
allow any discovery on this issue, believing the parole evidence rule "compelled" such result. 
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In a 1998 deposition of Mr. Christenson in the Salt Lake Lawsuit, he stated (R 299, 300) 
Q Does it refresh your memory at all to see the stamped verbiage at the top of 
the page that when it's recorded it should go to [Zions] First National Bank? 
Does that refresh your memory at all? 
A This one is, the only thing that comes to mind is we were concerned 
sufficiently over the payment of property taxes on the property down there 
that I sent Merlyn down to Utah County to monitor every parcel that he 
thought could be under the Traverse Ridge mass description or the contract 
and there was a parcel that was owned by Zions Bank and they had called out 
the name and said it was being sold for taxes and Merlyn got in touch with me 
and says what do I do? I tried to reach Noel Bennett at Zions Bank I 
couldn't reach him and I said rather than letting it go through sale you've got 
cashier's checks in different amounts, go ahead and pay the tax and we'll 
settle up with Zions. That may have been tied into this. That's the only 
recollection I have. (Emphasis added) 
In the 1997 deposition, Mr. Christenson stated (R. 311, 312): 
Q Skip, I'd like to just briefly run through some of the things on discovery that 
I previously propounded to make sure the answers are still accurate. In June 
of 1996 I sent to your counsel a request for production of documents. I've 
alluded generally to those responses but I need to make sure that I'm not 
missing some documents. The first request was I asked you to produce all the 
documents that were previously recorded with the Salt Lake County and Utah 
County Recorder to support your claim of an interest in the property and 
again the only document that I received was Exhibit 1 [Assignment of 
Contract]. Are there any other documents that you're aware that would 
support your claim to an interest in this property other than Exhibit 1? 
A If there are I'm not aware of them 
The arrangement with Zions Bank whereby Mr. Christenson purchased the Property to 
protect the bank evidences an "escrow" or "trust" arrangement. This possibly explains why Mr. 
Christenson may have chosen to deed the Property to the bank as "trustee". However, only parole 
evidence can explain his intent. Summary judgment was improper with this question of fact before 
the lower court. 
It is obvious that Mr. Christenson believed he had divested himself of any individual interest 
in the Property. Two years after executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank, Mr. 
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Christenson produced his personal financial statement during his 1987 deposition. Such financial 
statement did not list the Property as an asset. The following exchange took place (R 318): 
Q Skip, preliminarily I have been given by Zions First National Bank, with verbal 
permission of your counsel, a copy of a financial statement dated March 31, 
1987, which, while not signed, appears to have been prepared by yourself or 
under your direction and I have several copies so I'll hand you a copy. I 
suppose we ought to use that as a starting point, Skip, to ask you if this was 
a statement which was prepared by yourself or under your direction on or 
about March 31, 1987. 
A Yes. 
Q To the best of your knowledge does it contain an accurate statement of your 
financial condition as of that day? 
A Y e s -
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Christenson also reconfirmed such statement during his 1998 deposition in the Salt Lake 
Lawsuit (R. 302-3): 
Q Skip, I'd like to show you a document which has been marked as Exhibit 1 to 
this deposition and as I represented to you off the record this was marked also 
as Exhibit 1 to a deposition in which I took your deposition in 1987. I 
represent to you that was a document which you provided to me. . . . I 
represent to you it's a copy of a financial statement that you gave me ten or 
eleven years ago dated March 31, 1987. While we were off the record you 
had a chance to look at it. Do you recognize this document? 
A Yes. 
Q Is this a copy of your financial statement of March 31, 1987? 
A Yes. 
Q To the best of your knowledge and belief is it an accurate reflection of your 
financial affairs as of that date? 
A I thought it was. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Parole evidence would easily show Mr. Christenson's intention to divest himself of any 
ownership in the Property. 
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SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST 
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE 
The lower court granted Appellee summary judgment. Summary judgment may not be 
granted when there exist genuine issues of material fact. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 (c). Upon review of 
a summary judgment, this court will liberally construe the facts and view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the defendants and against the plaintiff. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. Clark, 
755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988) No deference is accorded the trial court's ruling and legal 
conclusions. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 
1990). 
There are substantial genuine issues of material fact that precluded the lower court from 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Without parole evidence to clarify the terms and 
intention of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, it cannot be known: (1) Who is the grantor of the deed? 
(2) What "trust" does Mr. Christenson seek to represent? (3) Is the "trust" a "revocable" trust which 
would imply personal responsibility of Mr. Christenson? (4) Does the inclusion of the word 
"Trustee" result from the acquisition of the Property at tax sale to protect Zions Bank - in an escrow 
or trust type arrangement? The lower court cannot answer those questions without resort to extrinsic 
evidence because the Deed is inherently ambiguous and incomplete. 
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The issues of fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Appellee. 
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 
A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO A 
JURISDICTIONALLY-INVALID TAX SALE 
L 
A COUNTY MAY NOT TAX, 
NOR SELL, REAL PROPERTY 
LOCATED OUTSIDE ITS BOUNDARIES 
A. Utah Case Law is Dispositive on This Issue in Favor of Appellants. 
Although it appears obvious that a county cannot tax real property outside its county nor 
subsequently hold a tax sale on such property, Appellee argues that such an occurrence has given 
Appellee title to certain property in Salt Lake County through a Tax Deed issued by Utah County. 
Actually, Appellee does not necessarily argue that a county can validly undertake such action, only 
that it is too late to raise the defect at this point in time due to a four-year statute of limitations found 
in § 78-12-5.2 of the Utah Code Annotated. Such an argument is contrary to prior Utah case law. 
The first issue before the Court, however, is whether a county can actually tax and sell real 
property located in another county, whether by mistake or otherwise. 
10
 In addition to genuine issues of fact, Judge David Young had already verbally ruled (June 
2, 2000) in the Salt Lake Lawsuit that Mr. Christenson had no interest in the Property. (Emphasis 
added.) (Addendum E, R. 293.) "Accordingly, neither the Plaintiff [Richard A. Christenson], nor 
any of the Defendants in this action, other than the four Michel Defendants, have any right title or 
interest in and to the real property which is the subject of this action". Such ruling was later upheld 
on appeal before this Court (Court of Appeals No. 20000781CA). It is acknowledged that the Salt 
Lake Lawsuit dealt primarily with Mr. Christenson's claim to the Property through a 1978 document 
and that Appellant was not directly a party to such action. However, agents or principals of 
Appellant had funded and monitored the Salt Lake Lawsuit and were aware of its status. It is noted 
that the fee ownership issue was never raised by Mr. Christenson during the four years of litigation 
before Judge Young - an expected allegation if Mr. Christenson actually claimed ownership instead 
of just a "lien". 
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In the potentially dispositive case of Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783 P. 2d 
1045 (Utah 1989), the Court of Appeals considered whether a county could validly sell at tax sale 
real property not located in its county. The court began its ruling. 
This is a quiet title action to six acres of land in which defendant attached 
plaintiffs' record title by challenging the title of plaintiffs' tax deed grantor, Davis 
County, based on an allegation that the property lies in Weber County. Id at 1046. 
*** 
As the basis for this claim, UDOT alleged that, because the property is located 
in Weber County, Davis County had no authority to tax the property, to acquire title 
when taxes were unpaid, or to convey title through a tax deed Id at 1047. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT on the basis that the property 
in question was actually located in Weber County, not Davis County ("Thus, according to the trial 
court, the subject six acres 'is and has always been in Weber County.'" Id at 1049.) The case is 
interesting in that it dealt with a county boundary as defined by the channel of the Weber River - the 
course of which had changed over the years. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the property actually lay in Davis County and that 
the tax deed was, therefore, not invalid. 
As evidenced by the Stipulated Facts (Addendum G, R. 755) filed with the lower court, some 
of the property allegedly sold at a Utah County tax sale is actually located in Salt Lake County. In 
order for the Tax Deed to be valid as to such property, the property would have to be located in Utah 
County. The Salt Lake County portion of the Property was taxed and sold under the mistaken view 
that it was in Utah County. Accordingly, the tax sale, at least as to the property actually located in 
Salt Lake County, was invalid. 
B. Statutory Authority Prohibits a Sale of Salt Lake County Land by Utah County. 
All of the statutes authorizing a county to sell real property at tax sale limit the property sold 
to that located "within the county" For example: 
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Section 59-2-213 of the Utah Code Annotatedprovides that, u[T]he [tax] commission shall 
prepare and furnish to each county an assessment roll in which the county assessor of each county 
shall list all property within the county" (emphasis added.). 
Section 59-2-301 states that, "[T]he county assessor shall assess all property located within 
the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the commission" (emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-303(1) provides that, "[Pjrior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall 
ascertain the names of the owners of all property which is subject to taxation by the county . . ." 
(emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-325 states that, "[T]he county auditor shall, before November 1 of each year, 
prepare from the assessment rolls of that year a statement showing the amount and value of all 
property in the county . . ." (emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-1001 indicates that, "[T]he county board of equalization shall adjust and 
equalize the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within the county . . ." 
(emphasis added). 
Section 59-2-1351 sets forth the acceptable form of a notice of sale by the county. Such 
section provides as follows: 
"Notice is hereby given that on (month/day/year), at o'clock 
.m., at the front door of the county courthouse in County, Utah, I will 
offer for sale at public auction and sell to the highest bidder for cash, under the 
provisions of Section 59-2-135 LI, the following described real property located in 
the county and now delinquent and subject to tax sale." (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that at a tax sale, one county may not sell real property located in another county. 
To find otherwise would be in violation of the express language of the applicable statutes, contrary 
to Utah case law and against the intent of the taxing system in effect in Utah. Any sale in violation 
of such rules of law is jurisdictionally invalid. 
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EL 
THE CITED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
DOES NOT APPLY TO A 
JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SALE 
Appellee does not argue that a sale of Salt Lake County property by Utah County was proper. 
Instead, Appellee argues that it is too late to raise the issue because of a four-year statute of 
limitations on tax sales. The statute provides, in pertinent part: 
"No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to 
quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed 
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the 
sale, conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any other 
purchase thereof at any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one year 
from the date of this act. . ." 
The term "tax title" means any title to real property, whether valid or not, 
which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or 
transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any 
tax levied against the property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellee argues that such statute renders moot any defense or challenge to the sale. 
However, prior cases interpreting such statute of limitations relate only to technical challenges, rather 
than jurisdictional defects that render the purported sale void, ab initio. 
A. The Sale was Void Ab Initio. 
In Baxter, supra, the defendants challenged a 1969 tax sale. The court noted that the current 
four-year statute of limitations was not enacted until after that 1969 sale. However, the court 
observed that the earlier statute also made tax deeds "prima facie evidence of all proceedings 
subsequent to the preliminary sale [to the county] and of the conveyance of the property to the 
22 
grantee in fee simple." 783 P.2d at 1047, footnote l.11 Accordingly, the Baxter argument relating 
to a limitations period is similar to argument under the current statute. 
A defect in procedure of a tax sale is one thing. Statutes of repose may be enacted to prevent 
later arguments about procedure, etc. The sale of property not even located in the county holding 
the sale is an entirely different matter. The sale of such property is not authorized by law, was void 
ab initio, and such jurisdictional defect cannot later be "validated" simply because of the mistaken 
belief that the property was entirely located in Utah County. Such a concept violates due process. 
Appellee should not be allowed to bootstrap an argument that the statute of limitations somehow 
revives something that was never jurisdictionally proper to begin with. 
Appellee argues that the statute does in fact render any defense moot. Appellants point out 
the difference between "procedural" defects to a tax sale and fundamental "jurisdictional" issues that 
rendered the sale void ab inito. It should be noted that each of the three cases cited by Appellant 
uphold the statute of limitations argument for only technical or procedural defects.12 
Consider a hypothetical case where a county auditor in Juab County mistakenly puts a legal 
description on a tax deed of property located in Washington County - more than a hundred miles 
1
 The court did not rule on what effect, if any, the new statute of limitations would have on 
the outcome of the case. The court, however, clearly aware of both the old and new statutes, did not 
alter its implied conclusion that the tax deed would be invalid as to property not located in the county 
holding the tax sale. 
12
 In Peterson v. Callister, 313 P.2d 814 (Utah 1957), defendant claimed tax sale defects such 
as "failure to attach an auditor's affidavit to the assessment roll for the year the property was 
delinquent taxwise, failure to acknowledge the instruments [tax deed], etc." In Frederiksen v. 
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981), plaintiffs contended invalidity because "the tax sale was 
conducted by an employee in the Salt Lake County Auditor's office whose appointment as deputy 
county auditor was not made in writing and filed in the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk and who 
had failed to take any oath of office, as required by § 17-16-7". In Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1992), there were claims of lack of notice of tax assessment to the property owner and other 
claims invoking federal sovereign immunity claims. All were rejected by the appeals court due to the 
statute of limitations issues. 
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away from its correct location. The tax sale was held, the deed prepared and recorded, and no one 
was aware of the mistake for more than four years. The property which was mistakenly "sold" is not 
developed, and no one had any reason to know of the error. Appellee would argue that even though 
Juab County may have not had any jurisdiction over Washington County property, even though it was 
a mistake, the sale was valid after four years because no one knew to object. Such a result would 
frustrate the title system in the State of Utah and would be contrary to the intent of the taxing statute. 
To say it would be unfair would be an understatement. However, a similar situation and result is 
found in this case. The "mistake" was not in the legal description of the Property, but in that the 
Property was not known at the time of the sale to be outside the county holding the sale. 
Appellants herein acquired the Property in 1993 pursuant to a foreclosure sale. The Property 
was located both in Salt Lake and Utah Counties. No one had any reason to believe that an incorrect 
tax sale by Utah County nine years earlier could conceivably impact the Salt Lake County property. 
Now, another nine years later, Appellant argues that it has title to the Salt Lake County property 
because the passage of time somehow validates the improper 1984 tax sale of the Salt Lake County 
property. 
This argument defies logic. It does not accomplish what the four-year statute of limitations 
was designed to accomplish. It contradicts the express purpose of having counties assess real 
property taxes on property located only in their respective counties. To hold otherwise would allow 
counties to affect title to properties in other counties. 
B. In Cases of "Mistake", the Statute of Limitations does not Accrue until 
"Discovery" of the Mistake. 
The legislature has determined that in cases requesting relief from "mistake", the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
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the . . . mistake" (§ 78-12-26(3))13 It is error of the lower court to apply the asserted statute of 
limitations in circumstances of a mistaken tax sale by Utah County until the owners discovered such 
mistake. In this case, the Utah County error did not become known until after the commencement 
of this litigation. Accordingly, the cited statute of limitations is not applicable. 
C. The Lower Court Erred in Finding that the Tax Sale Defect was not 
Jurisdictional. 
In its ruling, the lower court held that no tax sale may be challenged after expiration of the 
four-year period in the above-cited statute of limitations. (Addendum H, R. 785.) 
The language of the statute of limitations cited by Appellee (§ 78-12-5.3) expressly only 
applies to ". . . any sale, conveyance or transfer of property in the course of a statutory proceeding 
. . ." (emphasis added). Any tax sale held in violation of the statutes cannot be said to be "in the 
course of a statutory proceeding" and such a defect is jurisdictional. Accordingly, it is error to apply 
the statute of limitations to such a sale. 
ffl. 
IN ANY EVENT, THE TAX DEED LANGUAGE 
RESTRICTS ITS EFFECT TO PROPERTY 
ACTUALLY LOCATED IN UTAH COUNTY 
The Baxter case, supra, noted that the various deeds in question, after describing the subject 
property in metes and bounds, also described that property as being "in Davis County". Such 
distinction appears to have been important to the court, as the remainder of the opinion addresses the 
issue of the county in which the property was actually located. 
Other statutes of limitation regarding waste and trespass to real property, certainly 
analogous to this situation, also provide for a "discovery" requirement. 
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The language of the actual Tax Deed in this case (see Addendum "A") indicates that the 
property sold at tax sale was only that property lying within "Utah County" The Tax Deed recites 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Grantor, 
hereby conveys to RICHARD CHRISTENSON, Grantee, of 200 South Mam #1200, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, State of Utah the following described real estate in Utah 
County, State of Utah (emphasis added) 
The Deed, by its express terms, limits the conveyance to property in Utah County The mistaken 
belief that all of the property lay in Utah County doesn't magically make it so It should be noted that 
the Tax Deed was not recorded in Salt Lake County - illustrative that no one intended it to affect the 
Salt Lake County property. 
To say that the Tax Deed also conveyed property in Salt Lake County violates not only the 
intent of the taxing statutes but the express language of the Deed which limits its effect to property 
located in Utah County 
Even if the Court should find that the current statute of limitations prohibits any claim of 
invalidity of the tax sale or resultant Deed, this Court is not prohibited from making a ruling that the 
express language of the Deed applies only to property in Utah County It was error by the lower 
court to ignore the effect of the language of the deed as restricting its effect to Utah County property 
CONCLUSION 
Any deed for which one cannot tell who is intended to be the grantor is inherently ambiguous 
or incomplete Just as the parole evidence rule should not be used to alter or change the intent of a 
document, it should also not be used to prohibit consideration of evidence clarifying the Deed's 
intention To do otherwise in this circumstance would clearly condone something unintended by the 
Deed itself and the circumstances surrounding execution of the Deed Substantial questions of fact 
exist which make any summary judgment order inappropriate at this stage 
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It is not disputed that Utah County had no authority to sell real property located outside of 
such county. The statute of limitations does not apply to the circumstances of this case. This 
mistaken and erroneous tax sale is not "in the course of a statutory proceeding". 
In addition, the Tax Deed itself restricts the property sold to that located in Utah County. 
As a result, the sale was inapplicable to property actually located in Salt Lake County. 
This Court should reverse the rulings of the lower court as outlined above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of July, 2002. 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
By: l ,;AM*/w i 4Asw 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
-Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants Uwe 
Michel and Ullrich Michel 
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This is to certify that on this / day of July, 2002,1 caused to be hand delivered two 
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to the following 
Vincent C Rampton, Esq 
Ross I Romero, Esq 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 




A. Tax Deed of June 29, 1984 (Utah County to Richard Christenson) 
B. Quit-Claim Deed of March 19, 1985 (Richard A. Christenson, Trustee to Zions Bank) 
C. Quit-Claim Deed of December 8, 1998 (Richard A. Christenson to TWN, Inc.) 
D. Trustee's Deed Upon Sale of April 14, 1993 (Zions Bank to Michels) 
E. Order of Summary Judgment of August 3, 2000 (Judge Young in Salt Lake Lawsuit) 
F. Order of August 24, 2000 (Judge Taylor in Utah County lawsuit) 
G. Stipulated Facts of October 4, 2001 
H. Memorandum Decision and Order of November 8, 2001 (Judge Taylor) 
I. §§ 78-12-5.2 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated (Tax Sale Statute of Limitations) 
ADDENDUM A 
Tax Deed of June 29,1984 
(Utah County to Richard Christenson) 
21303 
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ADDENDUM B 
Quit-Claim Deed of March 19,1985 
(Richard A. Christenson, Trustee to Zions 
Bank) 
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Mail tax nooce tx>_ Addrtm. 
Pi$e ILrfcw^ 
r^s—& til 
4065862 QUIT-CLAIM DEE 
Richard A. Chr i s t enson , Trustee *» jprt&tOC 
of Sa l t Lake Ci ty , County of Sal t Lake , Stata of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to Zions F i r s t National Bank, National Assoc iat ion 
tlx^^l 
of Salt Lake* City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
TEN 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake and Utah 
State oi Utah 
grantee 




That portion of Lots 3 and 4, and the West half of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying 
with S*lt Lake County, and also lying within the following. 
lo (COMMENCING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, 
N JTownship 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
-^ <thance South 1320 feet thence West 3353.6 feet, thence North 1320 feet; 
jthencc East 3353.6 feet to the point of beginnina. 
v il: • 
V * 1^ COMMENCING at a point West 197<» feet from the Northeast comer of the Northwest 
k ,\ J quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Ba3e and 
\ r '^ ^N-rjd'dn, and running thence South 2630.3 feet, thence West 1374.6 feet, thence 
^ j\J vNorth 2630.3 feet thence East 1374 6 feet to the point of beginning. 
V j 
ii WrrvEss the hand oi said grantor , this 19 th d*y of March , A. D one thousand nine hundred and e i g h t y f i v e . 
Signed in the presence of )^L^/^^4 
Trustee 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake 
On the ^ 9 t h 
thousand nine hundred and 8 5 
Jay
 0£ March 
personally appeared before me 
A. D, one 
,JRich.a£<T A.v Christenaon, Trustee 
the ugner of the foregoing uutnimait, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the 
- ' ^ciryPuhfi£ 





Quit-Claim Deed of December 8,1998 
(Richard A.Christenson to TWN, Inc.) 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
QUIT CLAIM DEED 
of Salt Lake City 
QUIT-CLAIM(s) to 
of 
for the sum of 
Richard A. Christenson 
, County of 
TWN,Inc 
Salt Lake 
CUT 1 "*PP43 BK 4 9 0 4 PG 8 4 5 t 
RANDALL A . COVINGTON 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
1998 Dec 17 3:45 p. FEE 10.00 BY JRD 
S D E D FOR FIRST AMERICAN TITLE CO 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tracts(s) of land in 
State of Utah: 
Utah 
, grantor, 




Commencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Rangel East Salt 
.ake Base and Meridian; and running thense South 2630.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East 1374.6 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor(s), this <f-rK day of %^<jLrr^^ju^^ y e a r / ? ^ ^ 
Signed in the presence of 
S T A T E O F : USLVl ^ 
COUNTY OF 
On the 0 day°f /hu>~ij\^ 
^C^A^J c( - Q^j^I^x^g^^ 
Richard A. Christenson 
year 
Richard A. Christenson 
*G*f 
, personally appeared before me 
duly 
, the signer of the within instrument, who 
ed to iH07ttR*mmS8ecut 
KRLYNR. HANKS 
111 Sod* Hal A*. 
MUfctCiy.UT 84111 
d the same. 
ADDENDUM D 
Trustee's Deed Upon Sale of April 14,1993 
(Zions Bank to Michels) 
WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO J 
Uve Michel 
8 922 Cobble Crest Lane 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
t 3477649 1* APRIL 93 03152 Pfl K A T I E L . D I X O N RECORDERi SAuT LAKE COUNTYr UTAH 
f O R I L L TITLE 
REC BT: KAMA RANCHARD i DEPUTY 
C5 
TEPMM'g DIED PPOK tlLI 
THIS INDENTURE, made April ?A, 1293, between SIOHS TIRST 
KXTIOMXL BAKX, au the duly appointed Truitoe under the hereinafter 
mentioned D^cd cf Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Trustee"), and 
mm KICESL and ULLRICH KICHBL, as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship, (hereinafter referred to as "Grantee"). 
W I T N fc 5 i 
WHEREAS, TRA?rXLI!f 7IXHXC1XL, a Utah Corporation, by Deed of 
Trust dated September 22, 1986, and recorded September 24, 1986, as 
Entry No. 432C535, in Book 5820, Page 763, Said Trust Deed was also 
recorded September 24, l.°36 as Entry No. 32147; in Book 2342, at 
Page 346, in the Utah Courty Recorder's Office., of the official 
records in whe office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake and Utah 
County, Utah, did grant and convey to SIOHS TIRST KATIOKAL BJlM, a 
national Association upon the Trusts therein expressed, the 
property hereinafter described to secure, among other obligations, 
payment of a certain promissory note and. inter^t, according to the 
terms thereof, other sums of money advanced, and interest thereon; 
and 
WHEREAS, breach and default was made under the terms of said 
Deed of Trust in the particulars set forth in the Notice of said 
Breach of Default hereinafter referred to, to which reference is 
hereby made, and 
WHEREAS, IZOJfS JI^ST MATIOX7iL BAXX, the Beneficiary or holder 
of said note, did make a D-sclar.'icion of Default and Demand for Sale 
upon said Trustee, and thereafter there was filed for record on 
November 23, 1992, in the office of the County Recorder of naid 
County, a Notice of said Breach and Default and of Election to 
cause Trustee to iell r;aid properties to satisfy the obligations 
secured by said Deed of Trust, which Notice was duly recorded in 
Book 6560 Page 0854, Said Notice of Default was also recorded in 
Utah County on December 1, 1992, as Entry.No. 65853, in Book 3048, 
at Page 901, of official records in said County, and 
WHEREAS, Trustee in cor*aquence of said Declaration of 
Default, Election, Demand for Sale, and in compliance with che 
tsrms of said Deed of Trust, did execute its Notice of Trustue'u 
Salt stating that it, as auch Truateo, by virtue of tho authority 






in lawful money of the United States, the property particularly 
therein and hereinafter described, said properties being in the 
County of Salt Lake and Utah, State of Utah, and fixing the time 
and place of sale as April 13, 1993, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., on 
the front steps of the Courts Building (north side), 240 East 400 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, • nd did cause four copies of said 
Notice to be posted for not leas than twenty days before the date 
of sale therein fixed, as provided for under Section 57-1-25, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended; and said Trustee did cause a copy 
of said Notice to be published for three consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper having a general circulation in the County in which said 
real property is situated, the last publication being at least ten 
days, but not more than thirty days prior to said sale; and 
WHEREAS, copies of said recorded Notice Default and of said 
Notice of Sale were mailed in accordance with Section 57-1-26, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, to all those who were entitled to 
special notice* of sale as in said Section provided; and 
WHEREAS, all applicable statutory provisions of the State of 
Utah and all of the provisions of said Deed of Trust have been 
complied with as to acts to be performed and notices to be given; 
and 
WHEREAS, Trustee did at the time and place of sale fixed as 
aforesaid, then and there sell at public auction to said Grantee, 
XJTT& XICHEL, being the highest bidder therefore, the properties 
hereinafter described, for good and valuable consideration. 
NOW THEREFORE, Trustee, in consideration of the premises 
recited and of the sum above mentioned bid and paid by the Grantee, 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and by virtue of the 
authority vested in it by said Deed of Trust, does, by these 
presents, GRANT AND CONVEY unto grantee, but without any covenant 
or warranty, expresc or implied, all of those properties situate in 
the County of Salt Lake and Utah, State of Utah, described as 
follows: 
PARCEL 1: 
THAT PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY LYING 
WITHIN LOTS 3 AND 4 AtfD THE WEST ONE-HALF OF THE SOUTHWEST 
QUARTER OF SECTION 10, SALT LAKE COUNTY: 
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, AND RUNNING THENCE 
SOUTH 1320 FEET; THENCE WEST 3353.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1320 
FEET; THENCE EAST 3353.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH THAT PART OF LOTS 3 AIJD 4, SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 
4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, LYING IN UTAH COUNTY* 
TOGETHER WITH ALL OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, 
SITUATED IN UTAH COUNTY, EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
A 50-FOOT STRIP AS DEEDED TO THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT, 
THE CENTERLINE OF WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF SECTION 10, FROM 
WHICH POINT THE NORTHKEST CORNER BEARS NORTH 5,078,2 FEET AND 
WEST 2667.8 FEET; THENCE NORTH 30 DEGREES 30 MINUTE8 WEST 
2829.7 FEET TO A POINT AND FROM WHICH POINT THE NORTHWEST 
CORNER OF SAID SECTION 10 BEARS NORTH 2640 FEET AND WEST 
3231.6 FEET. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING: COMMENCING AT A POINT SOUTH 1320 FEET 
FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 
10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 1320 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO 
A POINT ON THE SOUTH SECTION LINE OF SAID SECTION 10; THENCE 
WEST ALONG THE SECTION LINE 3353.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1320 
FEET, MORE OR LESS; THENCE EAST 3353.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 2: 
COMMENCING AT A POINT WEST 1979 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER 
OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 15, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, 
RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 
2630.3 FEET; THENCE WEST 1374.6 FEET; THENCE NORTH 2630.3 
FEET; THENCE EAST 1374.6 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 3: 
COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE 
MERIDIAN, RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 132 0 FEET; THENCE WEST 1 FOOT; 
THENCE NORTH 1320 FEET; THENCE EAST 1 FOOT TO TKE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 4: 
COMMENCING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF LOT 3, SECTION 10, 
TOWNSHIP 4 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN, RUNNING 
THENCE WEST 118.8 FEET; THENCE NORTH 35 DEGREES 45 MINUTES 
EAST 24.64 FEET; THENCE EAST 104.4 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 20 FEET 
TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING FROM PARCEL 1 AND PARCEL 3, THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED PROPERTY AS SET FORTH IN THAT CERTAIN PARTIAL DEED 
OF RECONVEYANCE RECORDED JULY 13, 1990, AS ENTRY NO. 4940537, 
IN BOOK 6236, AT PAS.* ,1085, SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S 
OFFICE, AND AS RECORDS JULY 31, 1990, AS ENTRY NO, 24328, IN 
BOOK 2 710, AT PAGE 2VJ, UTAH COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE TO KITt 
THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, 
TOWNSHIP A SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, IN SALT LAKE AND UTAH COUNTIES 
LESS AND EXCEPPING THE RIGHT OF INGRESS AND 2GZESS OVER, ABOVE 
AND THROUGH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBF*} PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY. 
IH WITNESS WHEREOF, said SIO»S TI5U5T KATIOXXL BAXX, as 
Trustee, has this day caused its name to be hereunto affixed. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
in its capacity as Trustee 
by ^^UA^^^K^ 
Gregory C. Taylor 
Its: Vice President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COCJNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
The fore-going Trustee's Deed upon Sale was ac)cnowledged bofore 
ma this 14th day of April, 1993, by GREGORY 0, TAYLOR, the Vice 
President of ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ^ h^rtrTCTTai Association. 
NOTARY K7SLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing At: 
ADDENDUM E 
Order of Summary Judgment of 
August 3,2000 
(Judge Young in Salt Lake Lawsuit) 
Bruce J. Nelsen (2380) 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN, PC 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)531-8400 
Facsimile: (801) 363-3614 
Attorneys for Defendants Michel 
C 3 2000 
DATE 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD A. CHRISTENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
UWE MICHEL and ANNETTE S. MICHEL, 
husband and wife, and ULLRICH MICHEL 
and CAROLA S. MICHEL, husband and wife, 
as joint tenants; JAY V. BECK and FAYE E. 
BECK, husband and wife, KENNETH J. BECK 
and MARILYN BECK, husband and wife; 
AFTON W. BULLOCK; GLADYS BECK; 
SHIRLEY B. NASH; DAN C. SIMONS; 
BECK LAND, INC., trustee; DAN C. SIMONS 
EQUITY TRUST, DAN C. SIMONS 
TRUSTEE, executed by BECK LAND, INC., 
a Utah Corporation; ALPINE, LTD., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; KINGS SIX, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; LAND WEST, INC., and 
PARLEY BAKER; THOMAS E. SAWYER; 
NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation; MYRON B. CHILD, JR.; 
GEORGE GAWAN; BEC DEVELOPMENT, 
INC,. W. K. ETHINGTON and ROLAYNE 
ETHINGTON, his wife; B.E.C. DEVELOP-
MENT; DAVID V. PETERS and EDWARD A. 
WHITE; FRANKLIN FINANCIAL, a Utah 
ORDER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960902187 
Judge David S. Young 
IMAGED 
Corporation, and NEW EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, a Partnership; M. B. CHILD AND 
ASSOCIATES and MYRON B. CHILD, 
individually; JACK M. STEVENS; JARRETT S. 
JARVIS and PATRICIA Q. JARVIS; ESTES 
HOMES, an Arizona general partnership; UTAH 
PALISADES CORPORATION; ASSOCIATED 
PROPERTY INVESTORS; DAN C. SIMONS 
EQUITY TRUST, DAN C. SIMONS, Trustee; 
PACE INDUSTRIAL CENTER; JUDY PACE 
BILLINGS, as Trustee for the DAVID R. PACE 
FAMILY TRUST; MICHAEL W. McBRIDE; 
RICHARD F. McKEAN; D. CLARK BROWN and 
RUSSELL W. CARRUTH; RICHARDS HAWKS 
ASSOC; DAN C. SIMONS EQUITY TRUST, 
a Family Estate c/o H. MARK SIMONS, trustee; 
ELIN CHILD, aka ELIN S. CHILD; MARVIN R. 
CURTIS, JR.; J. McDONALD BRUBAKER and 
SCOTT M. BRUBAKER; CENTURY GENERAL 
CORPORATION a Utah Corporation; 
THEODORE D. GARFIELD, GARFIELD, 
ASSOCIATES; GARNDER ENGINEERING; 
OLYMPUS AERIAL SURVEYS INC.; GORDON 
JOSEPH ANDERSON AND FRANCES JOYCE 
ANDERSON; RAYMOND MALLORY; 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, INVESTORS 
COOPERATIVE, INC.; O.L. HOLEY (aka 0. L. 
HOLLEY); MAX E. BAKER; R. R. 
SCHEIDERIDER; DON I. HANSEN and 
BARBARA HANSEN; BECK LAND, INC., 
trustee, ALPINE, LTD.; Notice of Federal Tax Lien 
in the amount of $11,595.27 against CHARLES W. 
TAGGART and in favor of the United States of 
America; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the 
amount of $5,981.31 against CHARLES W. 
TAGGART and in favor of the United States of 
America; Lien of Judgment in favor of IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah Corporation, d/b/a 
CREDIT ASSURANCE AGENCY as Creditor 
wherein ELIN CHILD and MYRON CHILD 
appear as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in favor 
of STANLEY BELNAP as Creditor wherein 
2 
MICHAEL W. McBRIDE and FIRST SECURITY ; 
BANK OF IDAHO appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DAVID 
BROWN appears as Debtor; Notice of Federal Tax ] 
Lien in the amount of $38,288.40, against DANNY) 
C. and SALLY J. SIMONS and in favor of the 
United State of America; Lien of Judgment in 
favor of DANNY J. JENSEN as Creditor wherein 
MARVIN R. CURTIS, JR. and CURTIS TECH- ; 
NOLOGIES, INC. appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein CHARLES W. 
TAGGART appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in 
favor of ROBERT FEHR as Creditor wherein 
MICHAEL McBRIDE appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of EMPIRE MILL & CABINET 
as Creditor wherein KITCHEN DESIGN STUDIO 
and DAVID BROWN, individually appears as 
Debtor, dated December 15,1989 and entered 
December 20, 1989; Lien of Judgment in favor of 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES as 
Creditor wherein KENT BRENT BERRIEL appear 
as and Defendant FRANCES ANDERSON aka 
FRANCINE ZAMORE appears as Party-
Defendant, dated December 27,1989; Lien of 
Judgment in favor of FIRST SECURITY 
FINANCIAL, a corporation as Creditor wherein 
RICHARD McKEAN, et al. appear as Debtors; 
Lien of Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein MARVIN R. 
CURTIS, JR., JOHN C. CURTIS, JR. appear as 
Debtors; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the amount 
of $50,599.04 against DAN C. SIMONS EQUITY 
TRUST, ALTER EGO, NOMINEE, AGENT OR 
TRANSFEREE OF DAN C. & SALLY J. 
SIMONS and in favor of the United States of 
America; Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the 
amount of $50,599.04 against CHARLEMAGNE 
TRUST, ALTER EGO, NOMINEE, AGENT OR 
TRANSFEREE OF DAN C. & SALLY J. SIMONS 
3 
and in favor of the United States of America; 
Notice of Federal Tax lien in the amount of 
$38,288.40 against DAN C. & SALLY J. 
SIMONS and in favor of the United States of 
America; Lien of Judgment in favor of INTER-
MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, d/b/a CREDIT ASSURANCE 
AGENCY as Creditor wherein DWIGHT BROWN 
and BEVERLY BROWN appear as Debtors; 
Lien of Judgment in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein MARVIN 
R. CURTIS, JR. and JOAN C. CURTIS, JR., 
appear as Debtors; Lien of Judgment in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
wherein JOAN C. CURTIS, JR. and MARVIN R. 
CURTIS, JR. appear as Debtors; Lien of Judgment 
in the amount of $2,044.78 in favor of UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein 
BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor, Lien of 
Judgment in the amount of $2,859.32 in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
wherein BARBARA HANSEN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of 
$3,226.88 in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COM-
MISSION as Creditor wherein BARBARA 
HANSEN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in 
the amount of $3,666.56 in favor of the UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein 
BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in the amount of $2,632.45 in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
wherein BARBARA HANSEN appears as Debtor, 
Lien of Judgment in the amount of $2,555.59 in 
favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein BARBARA HANSEN appear as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of 
$ 1,251.09 in favor of UTAH STATE TAX 
COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DANIEL C. 
BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment in 
the amount of $1,499.82 in favor of UTAH STATE 
TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein DANIEL 
C. BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of Judgment 
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in the amount of $1,752.42 in favor of UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor wherein 
DANIEL C. BROWN appears as Debtor; Lien of 
Judgment in the amount of $ 1,345.45 in favor of 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as Creditor 
whrein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as Debtor; 
Lien of Judgment in the amount of $2,044.95 in 
favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $532.72 
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $157.12 
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein DANIEL C. BROWN appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of 
$2,760,00 in favor of PEAY RENTALS, TNC, as 
Creditor wherein PARLEY BAKER appears as 
Debtor; Lien of Judgment in the amount of $286.12 
in favor of UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION as 
Creditor wherein JANET K. HANSEN and DON 
HANSEN appear as Debtors; DENNIS BROWN 
and VICKIE BROWN, Debtor; NEW EMPIRE 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; MYRON S. CHILD, JR., JUDY 
PACE BILLINGS, as Trustee for the DAVID K. 
PACE FAMILY TRUST; RONALD S. COOK, 
RAY W. LAMOREAUX, and WENDELL P. 
HANSEN; PONDEROSA ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
limited partnership Notice of Federal Lien in the 
amount of $500.00, against RICHARDS HAWKS 
ASSOC, JUDGE L. HAWKS, PTR, in favor of 
the United States of America; Notice of Federal 
Tax Lien in the amount of $510.00 against 
DANIEL CLARK BROWN and in favor of the 
United States of America; ALL AS IT APPLIES 




Defendants Michels' Motion For Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the above-
entitled court on Friday, June 2, 2000. Bruce J. Nelson, Esq., was present and represented the 
interests of Defendants Uwe Michel, Annette Michel, Carola Michel, and Ullrich Michel, the moving 
parties. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., Esq., was present and represented the interests of the Plaintiff 
Richard A. Christenson. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein; 
having found that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving parties are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; having noted that the Plaintiff had no objection to the 
granting of an Order of Summary Judgment; and the Court noting that all other Defendants have 
either failed to respond or have filed Disclaimers of Interest in and to the real property which is the 
subject of this action, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants Michels' Motion For Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly, 
neither the Plaintiff, nor any of the Defendants in this action other than the four Michel Defendants, 
have any right, title or interest in and to the real property which is the subject of this action. Such 
real property is further described on the attached Exhibit "A". 
DATED this O - day ofJjity^OOO. 
BY THE COURT 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
THE LAND PARCEL 1: LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH, AND 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
The surface rights only in and to the following described property; That part of Lot 1 and part of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian lying within Salt Lake County. 
Commencing at point West 1979 feet from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of said 
Section 15; and running thence South 2630.3 feet; thence West 1374.6 feet; thence North 2630.3 
feet; thence East 1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
THE LAND PARCEL 2: LOCATED IN THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH, AND 
DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
COMMENCING at a point North 00o17,13M East 1318.08 feet from the Southwest Corner of 
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
89°52'00M West 96.23 feet; thence North 35°45,00" East 1187.25 feet; thence North 85°44W 
East 732.71 feet; thence South 00°1718" East 1014.75 feet; thence South 89°52'00n West 
1333.21 feet to the point of beginning. 
THE LAND PARCEL 3: LOCATED IN THE COUNTIES OF UTAH and SALT LAKE, 
STATE OF UTAH, AND DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
The surface rights only in and to the following described property: That portion of Lot 3 and the 
West half of the Southwest quarter of Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, Salt Lake County, lying within the following described Tract: Commencing 
at the Northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 10; and running thence South 
1320 feet; thence West 3353.6 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 3353.6 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
Excepting therefrom all of the land heretofore conveyed to the Metropolitan Water District for 
the purposes of Alpine Draper Aqueduct (Tunnel): a-50-foot-strip, the center line of which is 
described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on the South line of said Section 10, from which point the Northwest 
corner bears North 5078.2 feet; thence North 30°30' West 2829.7 feet to a point and from which 
point the Northwest corner of said Section 10 bears North 2640 feet and West 1281.6 feet. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July, 2000, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. Esq. 
Nelson Snuffer Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
J. 
Bruce J. Nelson 
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ADDENDUM F 
Order of August 24,2000 
(Judge Taylor in Utah County lawsuit) 
FILED 
Fourth Judicta! D-stnct Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Ross I. Romero (USB #7771) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff TWN, Inc. 
f i t Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and 
ULLRICH MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 990402593 
Honorable James Taylor 
On July 26, 2000 at 2:30 p.m., TWN, Inc. ("Plaintiff), by and through its counsel of 
record, Randall N. Skanchy and Ross I. Romero, and Uwe Michel and Ullrich Michel 
("Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Bruce J. Nelson appeared at a hearing 
held before the Honorable James Taylor, on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. At the hearing Plaintiff and Defendants, 
455823vl 
through counsel, made arguments in support of their motions. The Court having reviewed the 
pleadings, heard argument and for other good cause shown, 
ORDERED, that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, the Court however reserving to the Defendants sixty 
days (60) from the date of this Order to conduct discovery on the sole issue of proof of 
Defendants' claim of ownership of the disputed property by way of adverse possession. If 
Defendants do not provide the Court with any additional evidence on the issue of adverse 
possession at the end of sixty days (60), the Court will enter an Order granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment in full. ^ 0 INK 
DATED this QA day of August, 2CK) 
d 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Bruce J. Nelson 
Attorney for Defendants 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Randall N.SlcS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / -^ day of August, 2000,1 cause to be hand 
delivered, sent via facsimile a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to the following: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM G 
Stipulated Facts of October 4,2001 
v v I -- • ti -iC- i it Ul 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UWE MICHEL, an individual, and ULLRICH 
MICHEL, an individual, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
Civil No. 990402593 
Judge James Taylor 
The parties above-named, by and through their counsel of record, stipulate and agree to 
the accuracy of the following facts without the necessity of submitting further evidence to 
establish the same: 
1. Prior to 1984 (and thereafter until 1995), Utah County sent out tax billings on the 
following parcel of real property (the "Property"). The Property serial number was B-324-A-B: 
Commencing 1979 feet West from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter 
of Section 15, Township 4 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and 
running thence South 2603.3 feet; West 1374.6 feet; North 2630.3 feet; and East 
1374.6 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The Property consisted of 83 acres of undeveloped property which (unknown to 
Utah County or Salt Lake County) was situated in both Salt Lake County and Utah County. The 
majority of the Property was located in Utah County, and a minority of the Property was located 
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in Salt Lake County. Due to survey errors corrected in or about 1995 (see Paragraph 8, below), 
Utah County believed the Property to be located entirely within Utah County in 1984. 
3. Property taxes became delinquent from the billings issued by Utah County. 
4. In May of 1984, Utah County conducted an auditor's tax sale on the Property for 
delinquent taxes. 
5. The Property was purchased at the tax sale by Richard Christenson. An Auditor's 
Tax Deed dated June 29, 1984, was issued to Richard Christenson and recorded with the Utah 
County Recorder on July 18, 1984, as Entry No. 21303 in Book 2150 at Page 588. 
6. On September 12, 1985, a March 19,1985, Quit-Claim Deed to the Property was 
recorded from "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee" to Zions First National Bank. Zions First 
National Bank had owned the Property prior to the tax sale. Such Quit-Claim Deed was recorded 
with the office of the Utah County Recorder as Entry No. 26380 in Book 2245 at Page 405. 
7. Utah County also assessed the Property in the 1985 and 1986 tax years. 
8. In 1995, pursuant to a survey conducted by the Utah and Salt Lake County 
Surveyors' offices, it was determined that a portion of the Property was actually located in Salt 
Lake County. Thereafter, and through the current time, Utah County has assessed only 77.224 
acres of the Property and takes the position that such portion of the Property is located in Utah 
County. 
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9. TWN acquired its claimed interest in the Property pursuant to a Quit-Claim Deed 
from Richard A. Christenson dated December 8, 1998, and recorded in the office of the Utah 
County Recorder on December 17, 1998, as Entry No. 132243 in Book 4904 at Page 845. 
DATED this *-f day of October, 2001. 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
j Ai 
mice J. Nelson 
NELSON, RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ADDENDUM H 
Memorandum Decision and Order of 
November 8,2001 (Judge Taylor) 
Fourth Ju»i ca- f > : f ' r t Court 
of Utah County. Stale ot Utah 
//-?2U < / Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TWN, Inc. a Utah corporation, : 
Plaintiff : Memorandum Decision and Order 
vs. : Date: November 8,2001 
Uwe Michel, et. al, : Case Number: 990402593 
Defendant : Division V: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court upon an issue raised following trial. Counsel have 
submitted stipulated facts and have briefed the issue for the Court. The argument of the 
Defendants is rejected. 
Much of this case was decided, prior to trial, by summary judgment. This Court explicitly 
determined all issues raised in the case except whether the Defendants could establish title by 
adverse possession. Trial was held on March 27, 2001. Following the presentation of their case 
on that point the Court ruled that they could not succeed on that point. The Court ossler-ed t h e ^ 
cam dismissed and directed counsel for the Plaintiff to prepare an appropriate order. Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but no order, were submitted and signed by the Court. 
A motion for attorney fees was filed by the Plaintiff on April 10, 2001. The Defendant's 
responded to the Motion for Fees on April 26, 2001 and, on May 3, 2001, asked the Court to 
rule. On that same date the Defendants filed "Defendant's Objections to Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions (Amended) Submitted April 25, 2001," The Court notes that amended proposed 
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findings were not submitted to the Court on April 25 although they probably were circulated to 
counsel at about that time. It is in this objection that the Defendants, for the first time, formally 
raised the issue now argued, that is, that a portion of the property conveyed in the tax deed of 
1984 actually was located outside of Utah County. The Plaintiff responded to the objection and 
the matter was set for oral argument on June 5, 2001. At the hearing the motion for attorney fees 
was denied. The Court perceived that the parties were not in substantial disagreement as to 
relevant facts on this issue but that they had different views of the law. Counsel were asked to 
prepare a stipulated statement of fact and to submit more extensive briefs. Although that 
procedure has taken some time, the briefing is now complete and the Court is ready to rule on the 
issue. 
The Plaintiffs argue, first of all, that the Defendants should not be entitled to bring this 
new issue before the Court after summary judgment and trial on a narrow and different issue. The 
Court has allowed the question to be heard because of the argument that the question was not 
procedural but jurisdictional. Jurisdiction cannot be waived or created by stipulation. 
Nevertheless, after considering the briefs and stipulated facts the Coun is saxisfied that this 
question is not jurisdictional and that the Court did have jurisdiction to issue a final judgment as 
ordered. The issue was not raised in a timely manner and should not, therefore, have been 
considered. 
The forgoing notwithstanding, the Court also rules, in the alternative, that the statute of 
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limitations regarding tax deeds is plenary and bars the argument made in this case. Tax deeds are 
meant to establish a title which can be absolutely relied upon once the four year statute of 
limitations has passed Any deed executed and recorded on property similarly situated would 
have appeared on the records of Utah County but not in Salt Lake County. There is no question 
raised in the stipulated facts as to exactly what property was included within the tax deed 
description, only the relationship between the property and the county line. The Court finds that 
the statute of limitations with regard to tax deeds is intended to end any and all possible 
challenges to such deeds The claim raised by the Defendants here is, therefore, barred. 
An order incorporating this Court's conclusions as expressed in the findings executed on 
April 3, 2001 has never been submitted to the Court The Court finds that such a further order 
would be superfluous. The findings are hereby reaffirmed This case is di«»*$&sd by this order. 
No further order need be submitted. This is intended to be the final ruling of this Court on this 
V? \NREO/ /y 
matter. 
Dated this 8th day of November, 2 0 0 0 
Judge James R 
Fourth Judicial District^ 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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TWN v. tTWE 990402593 Memorandum Decision and Order 11/9/01 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
Bruce J. Nelson 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84L62 
XI 
i   
7h. Mailed this | day of / / (LK{ 2001, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
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ADDENDUM I 
§§ 78-12-5.2 and 5.3, Utah Code Annotated 
(Tax Sale Statute of Limitations) 
78-12-5.2. Ho lde r of t ax t i t le — Limi ta t ions of ac t ion or 
defense — Prov i so . 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real 
property or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof 
shall be commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax 
title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, 
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or 
directly to any other purchase thereof at any public or private 
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the date of 
this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar any 
action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such 
property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or 
been in actual possession of such property within four years 
from the commencement or interposition of such action or 
defense. And provided further, that this section shall not bar 
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder of a 
tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds a lien 
against such property which is equal or superior to the claim 
of the holder of such tax title. 1953 
78-12-5.3. Defini t ions of " tax t i t le" a n d "act ion." 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section 78-12-5.2 and 
Section 59-2-1364, and the related amended Sections 78-12-5, 
78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real property, 
whether valid or not, which has been derived through or is 
dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property 
in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of 
any tax levied against the property whereby the property is 
relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these sections includes 
counterclaims and cross-complaints and all civil actions 
wherein affirmative relief is sought. 1987 
ADDENDUM G 
Time Line of Relevant Dates and Events 
TIME LINE OF RELEVANT DATES AND EVENTS 
Date Event 
May 1984 Property purchased by Mr. Christenson at tax sale. [R. R. 
1380 at 9.] 
June 1984 Tax Deed from Utah County to Mr. Christenson. [Ex. 1.] 
March 1985 Quitclaim Deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank ["1985 
Deed to Zions"]. [Ex.2.] 
September 1986 Warranty Deed from Zions Bank to Franklin Financial. [Ex. 
5.] 
September 1986 Trust Deed from Franklin Financial, as Trustor, with Zions 
Bank, as beneficiary. [Ex. 6.] 
March. 1987 Mr. Christenson's Financial Statement dated March 31, 1987. 
[Ex. 10.] 
April 1993 Trustee's Deed to the Michels. [Ex. 4.] 
March 1996 Mr. Christenson filed his Complaint in the SLC Lawsuit to 
foreclose a beneficial interest in the Property. [Ex. 8.] 
December 1998 Quitclaim Deed from Mr. Christenson to TWN. [Ex. 3.] 
January 1999 Mr. Christenson signed the Affidavit that was read into 
evidence at trial. 
July 1999 This action was commenced. [R. 9.] 
August 2000 Order of Summary Judgment entered in the SLC Lawsuit, 
holding that Mr. Christenson has no right, title or interest in 
the Property. [Ex. 9.] 
August 2000 Summary Judgment entered in favor of TWN and against the 
Michels in this action. 
March 2003 The decision in TWN I was issued by the Court. 
August 2004 The trial of this action was held following remand. 
ADDENDUM H 
Summary of Evidence Supporting and 
Contradicting TWN's Claim That Mr. 
Christenson, in Signing the 1985 Deed to 
Zions with the Word "Trustee" After His 
Name, Intended Only to Convey His Interest 
in the Property as Trustee of Cape Trust 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING AND CONTRADICTING 
TWN'S CLAIM THAT MR CHRISTENSON, IN SIGNING 
THE 1985 DEED TO ZIONS WITH THE WORD "TRUSTEE" 
AFTER HIS NAME, INTENDED ONLY TO CONVEY HIS 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY AS TRUSTEE OF CAPE TRUST 
Evidence Supporting The Claim 
1. The statement read from the Affidavit 
that Mr. Christenson signed the 1985 
Deed to Zions intending to convey only 
his interest in the Property as trustee of the 
Cape Trust. [R. 1379 at 24-25.] 
2. Mr. Christenson testified that "we try 
to be specific as to what trust I'm 
conveying (inaudible) signing it" and 
"You wouldn't put 'Trustee' in it if you 
were signing (inaudible). [R. 1379 at 39.] 
Evidence Contradicting The Claim 
1. Mr. Christenson's testimony that he 
bought the Property at the tax sale in May 
1984 to protect the Property for Zions 
Bank. [R. 1380 at 8-9.] 
2. Mr. Christenson's testimony that he 
conveyed the Property to Zions Bank in 
exchange for Zions reimbursing him for 
what he paid to purchase the Property at 
the tax sale. [R. 1380 at 10-12.] 
3. There is no evidence that at the time 
Mr. Christenson signed the 1985 Deed to 
Zions, he actually held any interest in the 
Property as trustee of Cape Trust or any 
other trust. [See TWNI at n.2.] 
4. After the 1985 Deed to Zions was 
recorded, the Utah County Recorder's 
Office showed that title to the Property 
was vested in Zions, not Mr. Christenson. 
[R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 8 at % 7.] 
5. At no time following the recording of 
the 1985 Deed to Zions did the Utah 
County Assessor's Office assess property 
taxes on the Property to Mr. Christenson. 
[R. 1380 at 91; Ex. 8 at f 8.] 
Claim Evidence Contradicting The Claim 
6. Mr. Christenson had his company, 
Franklin Financial, purchase the Property 
from Zions in 1986. [R. 1380 at 16.] 
7. Franklin Financial borrowed money 
from Zions to purchase the Property in 
1986, and pledged the Property to Zions to 
secure the loan. [R. 1380 at 20-21; Ex. 6.] 
8. Mr. Christenson did not show the 
Property to be an asset owned by him on 
his Financial Statement dated March 1, 
1987. [Ex. 10.] 
9. In the SLC Lawsuit filed in 1996, Mr. 
Christenson did not claim to be the owner 
of the Property. [Ex.8.] 
10. The Third District Court ruled in its 
Summary Judgment Order in the SLC 
Lawsuit that Mr. Christenson had no 
ownership interest in the Property. [Ex. 
9.] 
